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The use of management controls in different cultural regions:  
An empirical study of Anglo-Saxon, Germanic and Nordic practices 
 
ABSTRACT 
Most cross-cultural studies on management control (MC) have compared Anglo-Saxon firms to 
Asian firms, leaving us with limited understanding of potential differences between other cultural 
regions, in particular those of developed Western societies. This study addresses differences and 
similarities in management controlMC practices in Anglo-Saxon (Australia, English Canada), 
Germanic (Austria, Belgium [Flanders], Germany), and Nordic firms (Denmark, Finland, Norway, 
Sweden). Unique data is collected through structured interviews with 593 strategic business units 
(SBUs). We find many differences in the use of control MC practices in these regions and we 
discuss the ability of cultural traits to explain these findings, although there are . However, we also 
find a number of similarities despite cultural differences. We discuss whether and why cultural 
traits explain these findings. We further explore variations in MC practices that are not aligned to 
cultural traits by examining whether there MC practices are interdependent. Our findings reveal a 
number of interdependencies that hold across cultural regions, but also demonstrate that certain 
associations appear to be dependent on the cultural context of the SBU. 
Moroever, we reveal how interdependencies between management control practices vary in 
different cultural regions. We outline the implications of these and other findings for theory 
development.  
 







Is it a small world of management control (MC) practices? Some scholars have suggested 
tendencies for a convergence of MC practices due to, for instance, globalization of markets and 
transnational regulation (Granlund & Lukka, 1998). Others argue that variances in institutional 
forces and social factors will lead to a divergence in MC practices employed by firms in different 
cultural contexts (Bhimani, 1999; Harrison & McKinnon, 1999; 2007). From a managerial 
perspective, globalization has created a need to understand how, or whether, to adapt MC practices 
to a local culture. Do some practices fit across all cultures, while others need to be tailored to local 
circumstances to achieve desired outcomes? As Merchant, Van der Stede, Lin and Yu (2011) 
argue, we are at an early stage in our understanding of which MC practices should be adapted and 
how, to suit a particular cultural context (see, for instance, also Allen, White, Takeda & Helms, 
2004; Björkman & Lu, 1999; Chow, Shields & Wu, 1999; Milkovich & Bloom, 1998; Otley, 
2016). 
In this study we seek to better understand the influence of cultural on the design and use of 
MC practices. Specifically, we investigate variation in MC practices between Western cultures, 
for three main reasons. First, most prior studies have focused on comparisons between Anglo-
Saxon (mostly US and Australia) and Asian firms (see Endenich, Brandau & Hoffjan, 2011). To 
develop a more general theory of the influence of culture on the design and use of MC practices, 
we need to explore how they vary between other cultural regions. In particular, there are significant 
cultural differences between Western nations (Hofstede 1980; 2001; House, Hanges, Javidan, 
Dorfman & Gupta, 2004), and these differences are likely to have implications for the design and 
use of MC practices (see e.g., Jansen, Merchant & Van der Stede, 2009). Although there is quite 
some empirical evidence as to whether or not MC practices vary between Western cultures and to 
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what extent, these studies are mostly based on data collected in no more than three nations (Ahrens, 
1997; Bae, Chen & Lawler, 1998; Carr & Tomkins, 1996; Chung, Gibbons & Schoch, 2006; 
Coates, Davis & Emmanuel, 1992; Coates, Davis & Stacey, 1995; Dossi & Patelli 2008, 2010; 
Faulkner, Pitkethly & Child, 2002; Fischer, 2004; Jansen et al., 2009; Lubatkin, Calori, Very & 
Veiga, 1998; Merchant et al., 2011; Meyer & Hammerschmid, 2010; Myloni, Harzing & Mirza, 
2004; Pennings, 1993; Van der Stede, 2003). Moreover, studies that investigate a larger number 
of nations (Chiang & Birtch, 2010; Gooderham, Nordhang & Ringdal, 2006; Hoffman, 2007; 
Newman & Nollen, 1996; Peretz & Fried, 2012; Roth & O’Donnell, 1996; Schuler & Rogovsky, 
1998; Tosi & Greckhamer, 2004; Williams & van Triest 2009) fail to investigate the supra-national 
level. This is surprising as research indicates that cultural differences may be more driven by the 
supra-national level than by the national level (Beugelsdijk, Kostova & Roth, 2017). 
Second, the range of MC practices examined in cross-cultural analysis is relatively limited, 
with most studies focusing on incentive systems, budgeting and performance measurement (e.g., 
Chow, Lindquist & Wu, 2001; Harrison, 1993; Jansen et al., 2009; Merchant et al., 2011; Van der 
Stede, 2003), and selected administrative controls (e.g., Birnberg & Snodgrass, 1988; Chow et al., 
1999; Harrison, McKinnon, Panchapakesan & Leung, 1994; Williams & Seaman, 2001). The MC 
literature, however, points to a much wider range of practices available to managers to influence 
subordinate behaviours (Bedford & Malmi, 2015; Malmi & Brown, 2008; Merchant & Van der 
Stede, 2012; Simons, 1995). Currently there is little understanding about whether or not the design 
and use of this wider set of  MC practices that commonly form part of a MC package are, or should 
be, adapted to different cultural contexts. 
Third, as recent literature on MC systems and packages illustrates (e.g., Bedford, Malmi & 
Sandelin, 2016; Grabner & Moers, 2013), the effectiveness of many individual MC practices may 
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be wholly or partly dependent on other MC practices. Observing differences in individual practices 
between regions, which cannot be explained by cultural traits nor by a large number of traditional 
contingency or other firm related factors, may suggest that the design and use of other controls 
explain this variation. This would hint towards the fact possibility that these MC practices are 
jointly designed and form a system. 
TheTwo general research question thats guides our inquiry is: 1) Do MC practices vary in 
different Western cultural regions?, and 2) how do MC practices relate to each other in different 
Western cultural regions. As we have relatively little understanding of how MC practices vary 
between Western regions and no prior empirical or theoretical insights into how interdependencies 
between MC practices might be influenced by culture, we take an exploratory approach (Locke, 
2007). Hence, the purpose of this study is to provide an empirical basis to support the development 
of a more comprehensive theory of cross-cultural variation in MC practices. We also find that 
certain variations in MC practices between cultural regions are not easily explainable in terms of 
cultural traits. We examine the possibility that such variation may be due to interdependencies 
between MC practices, providing insight into whether and how interdependencies vary between 
cultural contexts.Our approach seeks to provide insight into the relevance and interdependencies 
of various MC practices in different cultures. 
In this study, we draw on Malmi and Brown’s (2008) framework of MC as a package. This 
framework suggests that MCs should be understood in a broad sense and encompass traditional 
systems, for instance performance measurement and budgeting, as well as organizational structure, 
management processes and cultural controls. In this vein, we understand management controls as 
those “systems, rules, practices, values and other activities management put in place in order to 
direct employee behaviour” (Malmi & Brown, 2008, 290). Studies of MCs largely focus on single 
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formal practices or processes, and their variance is mostly explained with contingency factors in 
one culture (Chenhall, 2007). In this study we address a large variety of control practices to provide 
empirical evidence for subsequent theory development regarding which controls should be 
amended to cultural circumstances and how. 
We study MC practices in three cultural regions: Anglo-Saxon (Australia, English Canada), 
Germanic (Austria, Belgium [Flanders] and Germany) and Nordic (Denmark, Finland, Norway 
and Sweden). These three cultural regions are based on cross-cultural management research 
(House et al., 2004). They are motivated by a lack of understanding as to how MCs in Germanic 
and Nordic countries vary in relation to Anglo-Saxon regions (Newman & Nollen, 1996). Scholars 
in this field maintain that nation states should not be equated with cultures (Baskerville, 2003). 
Therefore, we follow researchers of the Global Leadership and Organizational Behavior 
Effectiveness Research (GLOBE) project who cluster societies based on religion, language, 
geography and ethnicity, and work-related values and attitudes (Gupta & Hanges, 2004). One 
reason for choosing their framework is that it builds on and extends the work of Hofstede (1980) 
who has been the main source for studies on cross-cultural practices in the MC literature (Harrison 
& McKinnon, 1999). Hence, we draw on the most comprehensive research available to categorize 
societies into cultural regions which have similar cultural implications for the design and use of a 
firm’s MCs. 
The study uses survey data from structured interviews with 593 SBUs in these countries. 
The number of observations, as well as the method of data collection by interviews instead of 
postal or web-based surveys, increases the reliability of our findings. We study MC practices at 
the level of SBUs of firms. Studying SBUs should reveal a more homogeneous picture than 
studying MC practices at the firm-level (Kruis, Speklé & Widener, 2016), as each business unit is 
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likely to face unique competitive forces (and further contextual factors) compared to other business 
units of the firm. Although the data comes from SBUs from different industries, the sampling was 
stratified to ensure similar enough distribution of SBU’s from different industries and of different 
sizes from each country and region. We also control for a wide range of contextual factors, 
including dimensions of the environment and firm strategy, as well as a number of other potential 
explanatory factors, to reveal variations in MCs due to differences in the cultural characteristics of 
each region. 
There are two main contributions of this study. The first contribution is to provide empirical 
evidence for how a wide range of MC practices vary between Western cultural regions. 
Specifically, we reveal the differences and similarities between Anglo-Saxon, Nordic and 
Germanic cultural regions – comparisons between the latter two have been subject to little 
examination in prior MC research (Newman & Nollen, 1996; Peretz & Fried, 2012). We find that 
Anglo-Saxon SBUs delegate decision rights, use matrix organization structures and boundary 
systems, involve suboridnates into strategic planning activites, rely on financial and relative 
performance measures, emphasize performance-based pay, use subjectivity in determining 
subordinate compensation, use non-financial rewards, connect leadership performance to rewards, 
and emphasize socialization processes to reinforce SBU values and beliefs more than their 
counterparts in Germanic and Nordic regions do. In Germanic SBUs management team 
compositions are more stable. Nordic SBUs review strategic ends, revise short-term performance 
targets and evaluate formally business performance of subordinates more frequently than SBUs in 
other regions do. The role of subordinates in action planning, diagnostic use of budgets and 
performance measurement systems, reliance on non-financial measures in performance evaluation, 
among other practices, appear similar across regions, despite differences in cultural traits. We 
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further contribute by developing preliminary explanations for MC practice variation based on the 
cultural characteristics of each cultural region. Some of our findings are in line with prior MC 
research that has examined particular cultural dimensions, predominantly between Anglo-Saxon 
and Asian firms. Other differences are inconsistent with prior research, and we suggest that 
alternate cultural dimensions, based on GLOBE, may have greater explanatory power for 
understanding variations between Western cultural regions. Additionally, a number of MC 
differences seem unrelated to cultural characteristics. But moreover, these differences do not seem 
to be related to a large number of factors prior studies have found to influence MC practices, and 
which we controlled for. Our second main contribution relates to this last point - we provide 
evidence on how a number of MC practices are interdependent with other MC practices we observe 
(Bedford et al., 2016; Grabner & Moers, 2013) and how these interdependencies appear vary 
between cultural regions. Hence, oOur findings suggest that to understand variation in MC 
practices between cultural regions, and to build a theory on MC practices, interpendencies need to 
be taken into account and for part of the focus of further research. 
The remainder of this study is structured as follows. The next section reviews prior 
literature on cultural regions and provides an overview of prior cross-cultural MC research. Section 
3 describes the research methods, and the results are presented in Section 4. The final section 
discusses the results, presents the contributions of the study, the limitations, and provides 




2.0 Literature review 
2.1 Cultural regions 
Contingency-based research assumes that because different countries possess particular cultural 
characteristics, individuals from within these cultures will react differently to the same MC 
(Chenhall, 2003). Prior cross-cultural MC research has relied predominantly on Hofstede’s 
typology. In this study we draw on two categorizations central to the GLOBE study (House et al., 
2004)1: their extended nine cultural dimensions and their concept of cultural regions.  
Scholars of the GLOBE study define culture as “shared motives, values, beliefs, identities, 
and interpretations or meanings of significant events that result from common experiences of 
members of collectives that are transmitted across generations” (House & Javidan, 2004, 15). 
Building on and extending Hofstede’s (1980) and Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck’s (1961) work on 
culture, GLOBE researchers identify nine cultural dimensions, including organizational and 
societal practices (‘As Is’) and values (‘Should Be’), from which eight are of relevance to 
intercultural studies of MC: assertiveness, future orientation, humane orientation, institutional 
collectivism, in-group collectivism, performance orientation, power distance and uncertainty 
avoidance (see explanations in Table 1 for differences of Hofstede and GLOBE).2 
 
<Insert Table 1 about here> 
                                                 
1 Both GLOBE categorizations resulted from a multi-method research project exploring relations between national 
culture, organizational culture and leadership (Dorfman, Javidan, Hanges, Dastmalchian & House, 2012). We rely 
on the intitial GLOBE Culture and Leadership Study (2004) in which 160 scholars in 59 countries  surveyed 17,300 
middle managers in 951 organizations across three industries (financial services, food services and 
telecommunications).   





Individuals from societies scoring high on assertiveness tend to be confident, tough, 
confrontational and even aggressive in social relationships (House & Javidan, 2004). Thus, people 
in these societies tend to have a ‘just-do-it’ attitude and favor competitive behavior (Den Hartog, 
2004). Societies scoring high on future orientation encourage and reward behavior such as 
planning or delaying gratification (Ashkanasy, Gupta, Mayfield & Trevor-Roberts, 2004; 
Kluckhohn & Strodtbeck, 1961). These societies tend to have longer-time horizons for decision-
making (Hofstede, 2001). In societies with high humane orientation, “others are important (i.e., 
family, friends, community, strangers)” and “values of altruism, benevolence, kindness, love and 
generosity have high priority” (Kabasakal & Bodur, 2004, 570). In these societies it is expected to 
find a participative leadership style (Dorfman, Hanges & Brodbeck, 2004). Institutional 
collectivism reflects the degree to which societal practices encourage and reward collective over 
individual action (House & Javidan, 2004). Organizations in collective oriented societies tend to 
stress co-operation of teams and reward group performance; low-collective countries, on the 
contrary, emphasize individual autonomy and reward individual performance (Gelfand, Bhawuk, 
Nishii & Bechtold, 2004). In-group collectivism is the degree to which individuals take pride in 
being a member of a collective; for instance, organizations, teams, families or clans (House & 
Javidan, 2004). Compared to the former (societal) collectivism, in-group collectivism is a small-
scale phenomenon. In high in-group collectivistic societies, organizations command high loyalty 
among all its members (Gelfand et al., 2004). Societies with a high performance orientation 
encourage and reward their members if they succeed in an activity (House & Javidan, 2004). Power 
distance is the extent to which members of a society agree that power should be stratified and 
concentrated at higher levels of an institution (House & Javidan, 2004). Members of societies high 
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on power distance are more accepting of an uneven distribution of power, status and wealth (Carl, 
Gupta & Javidan, 2004). Uncertainty avoidance is the degree to which members of a society cope 
with ambiguous situations with indeterminate outcomes (House & Javidan, 2004). Societies with 
a higher tendency for uncertainty avoidance rely on rules and orders and its members actively 
avoid high-risk situations (Hofstede, 2001). 
While Hofstede (2001) and GLOBE (House et al., 2004) study culture on the country or 
national level, scholars of GLOBE also study the supra-national level by constructing ten regional 
clusters (Gupta & Hanges, 2004).3 Research indicates that cultural differences may be more driven 
by the supra-national level than by the national level (Beugelsdijk et al., 2017). The GLOBE 
cultural region scores and averages, and explanations for each construct, are displayed in Table 2. 
Out of the nine GLOBE societal culture dimensions (e.g., House et al., 2004), we only list those 
that have been related to MC practices in prior research or, in the case of humane orientation, 
where it was possible to reasonably build prior expectations. It is important to note that Table 2 
shows cultural dimension scores in relation to actual practices. The GLOBE study of national 
culture asked respondents about both societal practices, referring to “things as they are”, as well 
as societal values, which relates to “as things should be”. We base our comparative analysis on 
responses to societal practices where “shared values are enacted in behaviors, policies, and 
practices” (House & Javidan, 2004, 16). Furthermore, House and Javidan (2004) argue societal 
practices affect leadership behaviors and organizational practices, because managers must respond 
to the way things actually are in practice. 
                                                 
3 The ten clusters are Anglo (e.g., Australia, Canada), Confucian Asia (e.g., China, Taiwan), Eastern Europe (e.g., 
Poland, Russia), Germanic Europe (e.g., Germany, Austria), Latin America (e.g., Brazil, Bolivia), Latin Europe 
(e.g., Italy, Spain), Middle East (e.g., Egypt, Marocco), Northern Europe (e.g., Denmark, Finland), Sub-Sahara 




<Insert Table 2 about here> 
 
Regarding GLOBE’s cultural dimensions, the following differences are noteworthy for the 
regions in our sample: (1) Assertiveness is lowest in the Nordic region; (2) Power Distance is 
lowest in the Anglo region and highest in the Germanic region; (3) Institutional Collectivism is 
highest in the Nordic region; (4) In-Group Collectivism is lowest in the Nordic region and highest 
in the Germanic region; (5) Uncertainty Avoidance is lowest in the Anglo-Saxon region; (6) Future 
Orientation is lowest in the Anglo-Saxon region, but differences are less pronounced than the other 
cultural dimensions; (7) the Anglo-Saxon region and the Nordic region show higher humane 
orientation than the Germanic region; and (8) Performance Orientation is lower in the Nordic 
region compared to Anglo-Saxon region and Germanic region. 
 
2.2 Management Controls 
We follow the Malmi and Brown (2008) framework to identify MC practices, as it focuses on 
controls managers use to influence the behavior of their subordinates, and it is sufficiently 
comprehensive to allow comparison of practices across a large number of dimensions. Based on 
this framework we consider variation in management control practices across six categories: 
administrative controls (further divided into organizational structure, management processes, and 
rules and procedures), strategic planning, action planning, performance measurement and 
evaluation, reward and compensation, and cultural controls.4 Below we briefly discuss the cross-
                                                 
4 Our questionnaire also contained a number of questions not directly related on controlling the behavior of 
subordinates. Those differences are not reported in this study unless there is a reason to believe that such practice 
might have an impact on how controls are used.  
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cultural research that has been conducted in each category and the MC management control 
practices to be examined in this study. Table 3 provides a summary of prior work. Definitions of 
the examined MC management control practices are provided in Tables 6 to 11 and Appendix A. 
 
<Insert Table 3 about here> 
 
2.2.1 Administrative controls 
Administrative controls refer to practices that designate formal authority and patterns of interaction 
within the firm (Malmi & Brown, 2008). We examine three sub-categories of administrative 
controls: organization structure, management processes, and rules and procedures. Although not 
always recognized as a component of MC management control (Merchant & Van der Stede, 2012), 
the structure of an organization has important implications for influencing the behavior of 
subordinates (Flamholtz, 1983). The most frequently examined aspect of structure in MC research 
is the extent of decentralization (e.g., Abernethy, Bouwens & van Lent, 2004; Bedford & Malmi, 
2015; Burns & Stalker, 1961; Bruns & Waterhouse, 1975; Gordon & Narayanan, 1984; Keating, 
1997; Merchant, 1981), also referred to in economics-based literature as the delegation of decision 
rights (Brickley, Smith & Zimmerman, 1997). Prior research suggests that the extent of 
decentralization, or centralization, is associated with variations in the cultural dimensions of power 
distance and individualism (Harrison et al., 1994; Williams & Seaman, 2001; Williams & van 
Triest, 2009). In particular, according to Hofstede (1980), authority centralized at the top levels of 
firms is expected in high power distance cultures. Additionally, GLOBE research (House & 
Javidan, 2004) posits that in low power distance societies, forces toward centralization tend to be 
weaker than in high distance power societies. Empirical accounting research has addressed 
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centralization and decentralization in Anglo-Saxon and East Asian firms and found support for 
these predictions (Harrison et al., 1994; Williams & Seaman, 2001). Similarly, Meyer and 
Hammerschmid (2010) found the extent to which human resource management decision authority 
is decentralized in Europe (i.e., the 27 EU member states) to be in line with these predictions. In 
this study, we examine the delegation of authority across three types of decision (strategic, 
business, and operational) and the use of matrix structures, which impose greater oversight on 
subordinate activities through multiple lines of reporting. 
Variation in the use of rules and standardized procedures has been associated with 
institutional collectivism (individualism) and uncertainty avoidance. Low individualism implies 
that one accepts having less control over work-related actions. In line with this, Chow et al. (1999) 
show that Taiwanese managers employed by a local Taiwanese-owned firm (lower in 
individualism) used more written policies, rules, standardized procedures, and manuals than those 
employed by a Japanese-owned firm (higher on individualism). According to the GLOBE study 
(Sully de Luque & Javidan, 2004), in societies that score high in uncertainty avoidance (e.g., our 
Scandanavian and Germanic regions), organizations prefer to rely on formalization and 
standardized procedures and rules. Empirical accounting research has found some support for this 
(Chow, Kato & Shields, 1994; Chow, Kato & Merchant, 1996; Jaussaud & Schaaper, 2006), with 
Newman and Nollen (1996) showing well defined rules and directions in high uncertainty 
avoidance settings have positive performance consequences. However, contradictory results are 
also reported, in particular Birnberg and Snodgrass (1988) found that, despite their high 
uncertainty avoidance, Japanese firms used fewer bureaucratic procedures than US firms. They 
ascribe this contradictory finding to Japan’s homogenous and cooperative culture, which makes 
rules and enforcement less necessary. Prior research indicates that two MC practices are 
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particularly important for implementing control at the top level of management: boundary controls, 
which specify limits on acceptable behaviours (Simons, 1995); and pre-action reviews, which 
require subordinates to seek formal approval prior to conducting certain activities (Merchant & 
Van der Stede, 2012). 
In an individualistic society, or in a society which scores low on institutional collectivism, 
(e.g., our Germanic and Anglo-Saxon region), extensive communication and coordination 
mechanisms are required to align managers’ plans and goals with those of the organization. 
Although studies by Ueno and Sekaran (1992) and Ueno and Wu (1993) of US and Japanese 
companies provide some support for the general idea that more individualism is associated with 
more extensive communication and coordination, it should be noted that these studies took place 
in the context of budget control practices. An important managerial process to encourage 
coordination and communication is the use of interfunctional or interdepartmental meetings and 
teams. Meetings serve as a monitoring device for the accomplishment of various plans and 
projects, and as an important arena for exchanging information (Simons, 2005). We examine the 
frequency of interaction and composition of teams within the SBU. 
 
2.2.2 Strategic and action planning 
Strategic planning can be conceived as a form of control if subordinates are allowed to participate 
in setting the course of action for an organization. Participation creates buy-in and it may require 
less extensive use of other forms of control to implement the strategy when subordinates are 
committed to the chosen strategy (De Baerdemaeker & Bruggeman, 2015; Dyson & Foster, 1982; 
Lee & Yang, 2011; Sponem & Lambert, 2016). One way to translate strategy into action (Groen, 
Wouters & Wilderom, 2016; Kaplan & Norton, 1996) is to ensure that short-term targets and action 
plans of subordinates are aligned with both strategic ends and means, and that plans are executed 
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and targets are achieved. Hence, both strategic and action planning can also function as a control 
device if subordinates are held accountable for executing the plans. 
Only one study has addressed cultural differences in how strategic planning is conducted. 
In particular, Hoffman (2007) investigated whether strategic planning enhances firm performance 
in Anglo, Nordic and Germanic cultures and found that the strength of the planning-performance 
relationship was greatest within the Nordic culture. This was attributed to power distance and 
uncertainty avoidance. With reference to action planning and budgeting, both power distance and 
individualism have been used to explain attitudes towards budget participation (Harrison, 1992; 
Li & Tang, 2009). In a low power distance society, subordinate reactions to participation are likely 
to be favorable, whereas in a high power distance society, subordinates are likely to prefer lower 
participation (Connor, 1995; Elenkov, 1998). Empirical accounting research has addressed this in 
various cultures and found support for the idea that power distance plays a role in the extent of 
participation, how participation is perceived, and also how participation influences organizational 
outcomes (Brewer, 1998; Lau & Eggleton, 2004; Lau & Caby 2010; Lubatkin et al., 1998; 
Newman & Nollen, 1996; O’Connor, 1995; Tsui, 2001). 
The arguments, and findings, regarding individualism are less clear.5 Some authors claim 
that participation is culturally appropriate in an individualist society as it provides a mechanism to 
internalize goals and standards (Milani, 1975). However, most authors have argued that 
participation works best in collectivist societies as group decisions are believed to be superior to 
those made by an individual (Harrison, 1992). The effects of budgetary participation have been 
shown to be independent of culture, a result attributed to the offsetting effects of low power 
distance and high individualism of many Anglo-Saxon nations and the offsetting effects of high 
                                                 
5 Empirical accounting research has not used GLOBE classifications. GLOBE dimensions do not include 
individualism but refer to institutional collectivism and in-group collectivism. 
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power distance and low individualism of many Asian nations (Erez & Earley, 1987; Lau, Low & 
Eggleton, 1995, 1997; Lau & Tan, 1998). 
In additional to examining the influence of subordinates in determining actions plans and 
setting targets, we also assess how comprehensive or detailed the plans are and how often targets, 
plans and resource allocations are revised. We could not find much research evidence on potential 
cultural differences on these practices. These dimensions could be related, for example, to 
uncertainty avoidance. In particular, high uncertainty avoidance may lead to increased search for 
information on uncertainties, more comprehensive planning to mitigate uncertainties, and 
influence who participates in planning activities. 
 
2.2.3 Performance measurement and evaluation 
Prior research has addressed the association between cultural traits and the reliance on, and 
preference for, financial performance measures. It has been argued that individuals in a high power 
distance society prefer clearly specified performance criteria (Chiang & Birtch, 2007). Similarly, 
due to their comparability, financial performance measures are also preferred in collectivist 
societies where people are concerned with comparison to others (cf. Hui, 1988). In contrast, low 
reliance on financial performance measures generates more positive outcomes in low power 
distance/high individualism societies because it implies greater incorporation of person- and 
situation-specific factors in performance evaluation (Chiang & Birtch, 2006). Power distance and 
individualism are also argued to be associated with target difficulty – individuals in cultures  with 
high power distance and low individualism are likely to be satisfied with high-stretch performance 
standards. Empirical accounting research provides support for these associations (Chow et al., 
2001; Harrison, 1993). 
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Individualism has also been related to other aspects of performance evaluation. In 
individualistic societies, where organizational loyalty tends to be relatively lower, people favor 
short-term evaluations and immediate rewards for personal effort and achievements (Ueno & 
Sekaran, 1992). Frequent formal appraisal has also been related to low (in-group) collectivist, high 
uncertainty avoidance and high assertive (i.e., masculine) cultures (Chiang & Birtch, 2010). In 
addition, it has been suggested that the degree of collectiveness has an impact on how managers 
appraise their employee’s performance, in that it influences managers’ perception of their 
employees’ motivation as well as how they weigh these perceptions when appraising employee 
performance (DeVoe & Iyengar, 2004). Myloni et al. (2004) use four of the GLOBE culture 
dimensions to compare performance evaluation practices between Greek firms and multinational 
corporation (MNC) subsidiaries from Europe, the US, Japan and Australia. Performance 
evaluations are more subjective (e.g., higher degree of favoritism and less use of written reports) 
in Greek firms compared to MNC subsidiaries due to the low level of performance orientation and 
future orientation, and high level of in-group collectivism and power distance. Besides 
performance evaluation, cultural traits also appears to influence the use of PMS for decision-
making, such as marketing, R&D and HR decisions. PMS implemented by headquarters have a 
high influence on subsidiaries’ decision-making when the headquarter is located in a society 
characterized by high individualism, low masculinity, low power distance and low uncertainty 
avoidance (Dossi & Patelli, 2008). These subsidiaries consider the PMS implemented by the 
headquarter adequate for their performance and local business decisions. In contrast, subsidiaries 
with headquarters from societies with high masculinity, power distance and uncertainty avoidance 
use autonomously developed PMS to influence local business decisions. 
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Prior research has investigated the relative emphasis on different types of performance 
measures in the relationship between headquarter and subsidiary in MNCs. Chung et al. (2006) 
compared the importance of performance measures between US, UK, German and Japanese 
MNCs. The relative importance of the different types of performance measurs was the same 
regardless of the MNC nationality. Financial measures were the most important category in all 
MNCs, followed by customer measures, internal business measures and innovation and learning 
measures. However, there are differences in the perceived importance of both financial and non-
financial performance measures between MNCs from different societies (Borkowski, 1999; Chung 
et al., 2006). US and UK MNCs place more importance on financial measures compared to 
Germany and Japan (Chung et al., 2006), particularly on those that are short-term in nature (Coates 
et al. 1992; 1995; Borkowski, 1999; Carr & Tomkins, 1996; Chung et al., 2006). In her study of 
US headquartered MNCs with subsidiaries in Japan, Canada, Germany or the UK, Borkowski 
(1999) found that sales growth was the most important measure for performance evaluation 
regardless of orientation. However, in the study by Chung et al. (2006), return on assets and cost 
reduction were more important to US and UK MNCs than to MNCs in Germany and Japan, while 
net income was more important to German and Japanese MNCs compared to MNCs from US and 
UK. Conversely, German and Japanese MNCs placed greater importance on internal business and 
customer measures than US and UK MNCs. Dossi and Patelli (2010) investigated the overall 
inclusion of non-financial performance measures and the inclusion of customer, internal process 
and people measures in the design of PMS employed by MNCs. PMS containing a high portion of 
non-financial measures were used interactively by MNCs with headquarters located in societies 
with high indivisualism, low masculinity, low power distance and low uncertainty avoidance (as 
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our Germanic and Anglo-Saxon regions). These firms also use a high portion of customer-related 
measures in the relationship between headquarter and subsidiary.  
It is interesting to note that prior cross-cultural research on performance measurement and 
evaluation has not addressed many important dimensions widely discussed elsewhere in the 
literature. For example, there are no studies on whether culture influences the choice to use MCs 
in a diagnostic or interactive manner. Prior literature is also silent with respect to the extent non-
financial measures are used, how detailed or aggregated measures are, how many measures are 
used for evaluation, and to what extent relative performance measures are used in different 
cultures. While it is common to use absolute preset targets, relative performance evaluation may 
be beneficial in the sense that it is free from game-playing. Relative performance evaluation is also 
objective in the sense that the benchmarks face the same uncontrollable factors as the evaluated 
subordinate.  
 
2.2.4 Reward and compensation  
In individualistic societies, performance-based reward systems are utilized more (Bae, Chen & 
Lawler, 1998; Newman & Nollen, 1996; Schuler & Rogovsky, 1998) and stronger links can be 
expected between individual compensation and personal success (Awasthi, Chow & Wu, 2001; 
Daley, Jiambalvo, Sundem & Kondo, 1985; Pennings, 1993). Moreover, firms in individualistic 
societies are likely to make more use of long-term incentives – otherwise managers will emphasize 
their own short-term gains at the expense of what is best for their firm’s long-term success 
(Merchant, Chow & Wu, 1995). 
Individualism and power distance have been found to be positively related, and uncertainty 
avoidance negatively related, to the proportion of variable compensation incorporated into 
incentive contracts (Chiang & Birtch, 2007; Tosi & Greckhamer, 2004). High individualistic 
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cultures seem to link financial rewards to high performance (Fischer, 2004; Giacobbe-Miller, 
Miller & Victorov, 1998; Gooderham et al., 2006), whereas the link between performance on non-
financial measures and rewards appeared to be stronger in low assertiveness and low power 
distance cultures (Chiang & Birtch, 2006; 2012; Newman & Nollen, 1996). Indeed, in masculine 
countries, the trend has been to make jobs more interesting by providing workers with greater 
autonomy and greater accountability (Jansen et al., 2009).  
Van der Stede’s (2003) study focuses on local and foreign subsidiaries of Belgian parent 
firms. Incentive system design was mainly driven by corporate parent effects, as opposed to the 
culture of the local business unit. This non-adaptation of incentive system design for local cultures 
is in contrast to Chow et al.’s (1999) findings about local adaptations of administrative controls in 
Taiwan. Jansen et al.’s (2009) study of incentive compensation practices in the automobile retail 
sector in the US and the Netherlands (a ow assertiveness country in which people are future 
oriented) demonstrates that the national setting does seem to matter in incentive system design. 
Compared to the US firms, the Dutch firms were much less likely to provide their managers with 
incentive compensation in any form. Moreover, Dutch firms based their bonus awards more on 
non-financial performance measures and used more performance boundaries in their 
performance/reward functions. Merchant et al. (2011) extended the results to Chinese automobile 
retailers and found that differences in masculinity (high assertiveness) could explain differences 
in the use of incentive compensation in firms in the three countries. The high use of discretion used 
to allocate bonuses in China was ascribed to the country’s greater power distance, which indicates 
greater respect for authority. 
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Prior cross-cultural research has not examined many relevant dimensions of compensation 
and rewards systems that influence subordinate behaviors. One such aspect is the purpose for using 
incentive systems. Reward and compensation systems can be used to motivate employees (De 
Baerdemaeker & Bruggeman, 2015), to direct their attention within organizations, and to attract 
and retain talent. We do not have empirical evidence on whether managers in different cultures 
put varying emphases on these different uses, and how that might be reflected in the design of such 
systems. 
 
2.2.5 Cultural controls 
Top managers can use recruitment, training and socialization to manage and change their culture 
to achieve better alignment between individual behaviours and firm objectives (Merchant & Van 
der Stede, 2012). Organizations also produce mission, vision and value statements that set out the 
values, purpose and direction for the organization; top management communicate these values and 
beliefs to motivate and commit subordinates (Simons, 1995). However, little cross-cultural work 
has been completed in the area of cultural controls (Chenhall, 2003). One rare example is where 
uncertainty avoidance has been suggested to relate to employee selection. Firms from high 
uncertainty avoidance cultures fill top positions in foreign subsidiaries with people from their own 
culture (Chang & Taylor, 1999). Other comparative studies on cultural controls (e.g., Bae et al., 
1998; Faulkner et al., 2002; Myloni et al., 2004; Snodgrass & Szewczak, 1990) have found neither 
differences, or provided insights on how cultural traits may drive observed differences. 
 
2.3 Summary 
Taken together, cross-cultural research on MC practices has provided informative, if somewhat 
mixed, results on how practices are tailored to suit local cultural circumstances; however, these 
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studies have predominantly focused on comparisons between a variety of Asian nations and the 
US or Australia (Harrison & McKinnon, 1999). Power distance and individualism have been 
aspects of culture authors have most often drawn on, but observed differences are also attributed 
to uncertainty avoidance and masculinity/assertiveness. However, it is not always clear which 
cultural dimensions might best explain the observed differences. 
There are cultural regions different from the Anglo-Saxon and Asian regions, including the 
Germanic and Nordic regions. According to the GLOBE study, these regions have distinctive 
cultural characteristics that may affect how companies in each region use their MCs, as for example 
the study by Jansen et al. (2009) suggest. Moreover, there are MC practices, such as planning and 
cultural controls, that have yet to be studied extensively, or at all, in cross-cultural research. Even 
within MCs that have been studied more extensively, there are several attributes of those practices 
that are still to be explored.  
For reasons outlined, we have not enough ground to develop specific hypothesis on 
differences between control practices in these cultural regions. Our study is exploratory in nature 
and we will compare our findings to those presented in the prior literature in the discussion section. 
 
3.0 Method 
3.1. Data collection 
This study uses data from a survey conducted in eleven countries, of which nine are included in 
the analysis.6 The same survey instrument was used in all countries (Schaffer & Riordan, 2003). 
                                                 
6 The original survey also covered SBUs from Italy and Poland. Within the GLOBE study, Italy is part of the Latin 
Europe cluster and Poland of the Eastern Europe cluster. With only one country per cultural region, and a lower 
number of observations than in the three cultural regions used in the analysis, we decided to exclude observations 
from these two countries. Following the GLOBE study, 6 firms from the French speaking part of Belgium and 12 
firms from the French speaking part of Canada were excluded. 
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The survey instrument was originally developed in English and then translated into the local 
language. The survey was subsequently back-translated by an independent researcher (Harkness, 
2003) to ensure consistency in meaning (Van De Vijver & Leung, 1997). The survey instrument 
was extensively pre-tested by researchers in each country with both academics in the MC 
discipline as well as practitioners representative of the target population. Sample information for 
each country is detailed in Table 4. 
 
<Insert Table 4 about here> 
 
The survey population consists of private for-profit companies that have more than 250 
employees. This minimum criterion was established to increase the likelihood that the MC 
variables of interest would be observed. Firms were included in the sample through a stratified 
sampling approach (Cochran, 1977). Samples were stratified by industry (manufacturing, service 
and wholesale) and size (medium, defined as firms with 250 to 1,000 employees, and large, defined 
as firms with 1,000 or more employees). For European countries, the sample was drawn from the 
ORBIS database, while Dun and Bradstreet was used for the Australian sample and the Scott’s 
National database for the Canadian sample. 
The unit of analysis is the strategic business unit (SBU), which is defined as a relatively 
independent entity that faces a unique competitive situation (in relation to other SBUs of the firm) 
and can be regarded as having its own competitive strategy. In some cases firms operated as single 
independent businesses. Following prior literature, SBUs and independent firms were considered 
to be empirically comparable (e.g., Chenhall & Langfield-Smith, 1998; Henri, 2006). In these 
cases, questions referring to the SBU-group headquarters relationship were ignored. The target 
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respondents are CEOs and managing directors of SBUs or other members of the top management 
team. Respondent titles by country are displayed in Table 5. 
 
<Insert Table 5 about here> 
 
Data collection took place from November 2009 to March 2013. Within individual 
countries, the data collection period lasted between 8 and 17 months (mean = 14). Due to the 
detailed and comprehensive nature of the survey instrument, data was collected through 
interviews. This minimizes the likelihood of missing data and increases the validity of survey 
responses as any ambiguities are able to be clarified with the respondent. Endenich et al. (2011) 
warns that such ambiguities may be particularly important in cross-country studies due to culture-
specific perceptions of identical phenomena. In total 2,199 firms were invited (via telephone or 
email) to participate in the study, with 694 firms agreeing to participate. We eliminated SBUs with 
a shared headquarter and SBUs with a headquarter in a different region, leaving a usable sample 
of 593 responses. Interviews were conducted face-to-face (71%) or by telephone (29%). Where 
possible, interviews were audi recorded. Most of the interviews were conducted by one of the 
authors, although in some cases two of the authors were present and in some cases research 
students were trained to collect the data. To ensure consistency of collected data, and to achieve 
reliability of measurement instruments, all interviewers were provided a detailed lexicon with 
comments and explanations, outlining concrete definitions of the MC practices being assessed by 
each question in the survey instrument. Similarly, detailed guidelines regarding the sampling 
procedure to be used in the databases when selecting companies was provided to all researchers. 
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Regular meetings were organized for research group members to discuss and improve the research 
design and method. 
Participants were assured anonymity and were explicitly informed that there were no right 
or wrong answers. At the start of the interview the interviewees were informed in very general 
terms about the purpose of the interview and about the interview structure. Interviewers asked the 
participants to answer questions from their perspective (SBU top management) and not from a 
headquarters perspective. Questions were always asked in the same sequence to create an identical 
flow of questions and answers across all interviews. Coding procedures were applied uniformly; 
finally, a check of the data for consistency and missing values was conducted at both the research 
group level and at the country level. 
 
 
3.2 Variable measurement  
 We used several constructs for each MC category outlined in Malmi and Brown (2008). 
Twelve constructs were used for administrative controls, eight for strategic planning, seven for 
action planning, 16 13 for performance measurement and evaluation, 10 7 for rewards and 
compensation, and seven for cultural controls, resulting in 60 54 constructs used as dependent 
variables. In addition to the region variable, 14 control variables were used to control for other 
contextual determinants. This included aspects of the SBU’s external environment and strategy, 
and other characteristics such as SBU size, ownership structure, and age. A complete list of MC 
variables and definitions are provided in Appendix A.  
To control for potential biases from the collection method we also included interviewer 
(researcher/student) and interview type dummies (face-to-face/telephone). Appendix B lists items, 
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anchors, and Cronbach Alpha for reflective constructs (between 0.64 and 0.88 except for the matrix 
structure construct with alpha = 0.59). Confirmatory factor analyses for the reflective constructs 
show factor loadings > 0.54 for all items (see Appendix B). 
For formative constructs, we checked item weights on the first principal component (Petter, 
Straub & Rai, 2007). Item weights on all formative constructs are positive and have weights above 
the recommended minimum of 0.30 (Hair, Hult, Ringle & Sarstedt, 2017; see Appendix B). 
Variance inflation factors (VIF) are calculated to assess multicollinearity. The maximum VIF of 




4.1 The use of management controls across cultural regions 
In line with the exploratory nature of this paper, we are more interested in the differences in means 
between regions rather than regression coefficients. Differences in the use of management control 
practices across cultural regions are assessed using ANCOVA and Tukey contrast analyses. The 
results, reported in Tables 6 to 11, show significant regional differences at the 0.05 or lower level. 
All p-values were adjusted using the false discovery rate method (Benjamini & Hochberg, 1995) 
to limit the risk of indentifying false positives. Descriptive statistics of the management control 
and contextual variables are provided in Appendix C. 
 
4.1.1 Administrative controls 
We find a clear cultural difference in the delegation of decision rights, shown in Table 6: top 
management in Anglo-Saxon SBUs delegate strategic, business and operational decisions more 
compared to other cultural regions (p < 0.001). We also asked respondents to assess the extent to 
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which subordinates have multiple reporting lines (some form of matrix organization). The results 
mirror those of decision rights: managers in Anglo-Saxon SBUs have a higher level of multiple 
reporting lines compared to Nordic SBUs, and Nordic compared to Germanic SBUs (p < 0.001). 
Hence, it appears that although subordinates in Anglo-Saxon SBUs have more power to decide on 
various issues than their counterparts in other cultural regions, they are also monitored by a larger 
number of managers. 
We asked the respondents to assess the extent to which they rely on various types of rules 
and procedures in guiding and directing subordinate behavior. Anglo-Saxon SBUs use boundary 
systems to a higher extent than companies in the other cultural regions (p < 0.01). Anglo-Saxon 
and Germanic SBU’s rely on pre-action reviews more than their Nordic counterparts (p < 0.001). 
We also asked respondents about various managerial processes. Anglo-Saxon and 
Germanic SBU managers meet more frequently within their SBU than Nordic managers (p < 
0.01).7 Our results also suggest that management groups within Anglo-Saxon SBUs (p<0.001) are 
more broadly based than those in the other cultural regions. Management groups within and across 
SBUs in the Anglo-Saxon and Nordic region are less stable compared to the Germanic region (p 
< 0.001). 
 
<Insert Table 6 about here> 
 
Our findings on the variation in the allocation of decision rights are in line with GLOBE 
research (House & Javidan, 2004) and prior accounting literature (Harrison et al., 1994; Williams 
& Seaman, 2001). Power distance is the lowest in the Anglo-Saxon region, while Anglo-Saxon 
                                                 
7 The average period between meetings in Anglo-Saxon (Germanic, Nordic) SBUs is 13 (22, 25) days. 
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SBUs allocate decision rights to a greater extent than their Germanic and Nordic counterparts. Our 
finding that Anglo-Saxon SBUs rely on more complex communication and accountability 
structures (i.e., matrix organizations) than Germanic and Nordic SBUs, and Nordic SBUs more 
than Germanic SBUs, could also be driven by differences in power distance. The lower the power 
distance, the more likely managers are to accept situations where they do not have sole control 
over their subordinates. The more extensive use of matrix organizations could also result from the 
higher extent to which decision rights are delegated, allowing multiple managers to monitor 
suboridinate decisions. This would also imply matrix sturtures are explained by differences in 
power distance.  
The GLOBE classification (Sully de Luque & Javidan, 2004), and some prior accounting 
research (Chow et al., 1994; 1996), indicates that in societies that score high in uncertainty 
avoidance (e.g., our Germanic and Nordic regions) organizations prefer to rely on the 
formalization and standardizationed of procedures and rules. In contrast, our results suggest these 
are relied on equally or even more intensively in Anglo-Saxon SBUs. However, this result may 
well be explained by the different focus of this study compared to prior research. Prior literature 
has focused on the degree of formalization more generally, and the use of standardized rules and 
procedures that specify how activities must be conducted. This study examines the use of pre-
action reviews and boundary systems, which specify behaviours. The more extensive delegation 
of decision rights by Anglo-Saxon SBUs may well explain why boundary systems are emphasized 
more in Anglo-Saxon SBUs than in Germanic and Nordic SBUs. Higher performance orientation, 
and an associated quest for excellence and performance improvement, may lead SBUs in Anglo-
Saxon and Germanic regions to use pre-action reviews more than SBUs in Nordic regions.  
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 The composition of various managerial teams has not been addressed by prior accounting 
research. The higher stability by Germanic SBUs may well relate to a greater in-group 
collectivism; in regions scoring high on in-group collectivistism, managers emphasize group 
stability However, the SBUs in the Anglo-Saxon region score higher in in-group collectivisim than 
Nordic SBUs, but we find no differences in stability between these regions. This casts some doubt 
on the ability of in-group collectivism to explain these differences. We also find that Anglo-Saxon 
SBUs have higher functional diversity of individuals in the SBU management teams than SBUs in 
other studied regions. As it is difficult to build compelling arguments based on GLOBE cultural 
dimensions to explain this difference, one possibility is that these differences may relate to Anglo-
Saxon SBUs using matrix organizations and delegating decision rights more extensively than 
SBUs in other regions. 
 
4.1.2 Strategic planning 
Table 7 reveals that participation of subordinates in strategic planning is less common in Nordic 
and Germanic SBUs compared to Anglo-Saxon SBUs (p < 0.001). We assessed interaction around 
strategic planning by looking at how often strategic ends and means are reviewed and revised. On 
average, about 40% of the SBUs in our sample review both their ends and means – either monthly 
or quarterly. For the rest of the SBUs, the review cycle is longer. Nordic SBUs review their ends 
more often than SBUs in other cultural regions (p < 0.01). Germanic and Nordic SBUs review 
their means more often than Anglo-Saxon SBUs (p < 0.001). Regarding revising ends and means, 
an annual cycle is by far the most common. With respect to revising ends and means, we do not 
find any regional differences. 
There are some regional differences in how comprehensive strategic planning is. In Anglo-
Saxon SBUs, strategic planning is less comprehensive than Germanic and Nordic SBUs (p < 
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0.001). In terms of specificity, i.e., how detailed and exact strategic plans are, we did not find any 
differences between cultural regions. 
 
<Insert Table 7 about here> 
 
In prior accounting literature participation is related to power distance and individualism, 
but it is discussed mainly in relation to budgeting rather than strategic planning. The finding that 
subordinates in Anglo-Saxon SBUs participate in strategic planning activities more then their 
counterparts in Germanic and Nordic regions is only partly in line with differences in power 
distance (see Table 2). On the other hand, institutional collectivism, where Nordic countries score 
highly, would suggest that participation should be extensive within Nordic SBUs (Harrison, 1992; 
Lau & Buckland, 2000). As this is not the case, this finding may suggest that power distance as a 
cultural trait is stronger than individualism or institutional collectiveness in explaining 
participation in strategic planning activities. 
The difference in comprehensiveness of strategic plans between Nordic and Germanic 
SBUs compared to Anglo-Saxon SBUs could be attributed to higher uncertainty avoidance. On 
the other hand, our findings on review frequency of ends and means are difficult to explain relying 
solely on cultural differences. It may be that more comprehensive plans create a need to review 
the means more often, as the pace and unpredictability of change has generally increased across 
Western societies. 
 
4.1.3 Action planning 
In roughly half of the studied SBUs, important areas of action are defined at the top and 
subordinates are required to develop specific action plans. Another common practice to derive 
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action plans is by intensive negotiations between managers and subordinates within planning 
guidelines provided by the top. Both practices rely on subordinate input and participation, 
facilitating commitment to action plans. No differences seem to exist in the autonomy subordinates 
have in developing action plans between the cultures we studied.8 We also asked respondents how 
short-term targets are set for both ends and means. In the majority of the SBUs, top management 
set targets for ends, i.e., what needs to be achieved, either as a top-down process or based on 
negotiations; there does not seem to be any cultural differences in terms of autonomy granted for 
subordinates in setting targets for ends. Subordinates have, on average, more impact on targets set 
for means, i.e., how ends are to be achieved, but we found no cultural differences in this regard 
either. In sum, very few SBUs allow subordinates to autonomously define action plans or set short-
term targets for ends and/or means. This indicates that, at least in the majority of the SBUs in our 
study, management attempts to link long-term and short-term plans together – not only by passing 
financial objectives down the ranks, but by ensuring that short-term action plans and targets for 
means – are in line with long-term strategic objectives.  
Nordic SBUs tend to update short-term targets more often than Anglo-Saxon SBUs, and 
these again more often than Germanic SBUs (p < 0.001). Resource commitments are updated more 
frequently in Nordic compared to Germanic SBUs (p>0.001).9 There are no differences between 
cultural regions with respect to how often action plans are updated. Similarly, we find no 
differences in how comprehensive and detailed action plans are.  
                                                 
8 We used five items (see Appendix B) to describe SBU managers’ participation in setting short-term targets for 
ends and means. For ends, more than 75% state that targets are set by top management with no or little participation 
of SBU managers. For means, 58% state high top management involvement, but almost 20% describe the process of 
having extensive negotiations with top management. 
9 For Anglo-Saxon (Germanic, Nordic) SBUs the average revision period for short-term targets is 4.0 (7.9, 5.8) 




<Insert Table 8 about here> 
 
Although the studied cultural regions differ somewhat in terms of institutional collectivism, 
our results suggest that action planning is done mostly as a collective process in all the regions. 
The more frequent updates of short-term targets in Nordic compared to Anglo-Saxon, and Anglo-
Saxon compared to Germanic SBUs may, however, relate to higher institutional collectivism and 
lower assertiveness, perhaps because targets are commonly used in performance evaluation. High 
institutional collectivism and low assertiveness may suggest that individuals in such SBUs seek to 
amend targets to avoid major discrepancies between targets and actuals – this could lead to 
confrontatiuonal situations during performance evaluation. It is difficult to draw on any cultural 
dimensions to explain why Nordic SBUs update resource commitments more often than Germanic 
SBUs, while there are no statistical differences with Anglo-Saxon SBUs.  
 
4.1.4 Performance measurement and evaluation 
In assessing whether budgets and performance measures are used diagnostically, our results 
indicate no differences between cultural regions (see Table 9). However, Anglo-Saxon SBUs rely 
more on interactive use of budgets (p < 0.01) and performance measurement systems (PMS) (p < 
0.01) compared to Nordic SBUs.  
Simons (2005) has argued that the more measures there are to evaluate subordinates’ 
performance and the more detailed those measures are, the less a subordinate can use his or her 
discretion in an attempt to achieve good results and vice versa. Our results indicate that Nordic 
SBUs use a higher number of measures that subordinates are accountable for than Germanic SBUs 
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(p < 0.05).10 However, Germanic SBUs include more individual behaviors, such as leadership 
achievements and individual effort, in performance evaluation than Nordic SBUs (p < 0.05). In 
evaluating subordinate performance, SBUs in all cultural regions put similar emphasis on non-
financial measures, while financial measures are used more in Anglo-Saxon SBUs compared to 
Nordic SBUs, and Nordic compared to Germanic SBUs. We find no cultural differences regarding 
how detailed or aggregated measures are. 
Compared to the Anglo-Saxon SBUs, the use of relative performance evaluation is less 
common in Germanic and Nordic SBUs, and less common in Germanic compared to Nordic SBUs 
(p < 0.001). Besides differences in the information used for performance evaluations, our results 
indicate that Nordic SBUs evaluate leadership performance of subordinates more frequently than 
Anglo-Saxon SBUs (p < 0.01), and business performance of subordinates (p < 0.001) more 
frequently than Germanic SBUs, and the latter more frequently than Anglo-Saxon SBUs.  
Performance evaluation can be used for various purposes: to provide feedback and 
facilitate continuous improvement (i.e., learning), to determine compensation, and to direct 
subordinates’ attention to important issues. We asked SBUs to assess the importance of each of 
these different uses. Anglo-Saxon SBUs place higher emphasis on determining compensation than 
Germanic SBUs (p < 0.01). No differences were found in how much emphasis is placed on 
attention direction and on learning. 
 
<Insert Table 9 about here> 
 
                                                 
10 The mean number of perfomance measures for Anglo-Saxon (Germanic, Nordic) SBUs is 6 (5, 6). 
Commented [DB2]: I don’t think this adds much. Reject 
change if you disagree (I’ve also deleted from tables) 
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It is not obvious which cultural dimensions could drive interactive use of budgets and 
performance management systems (PMS). High institutional collectivism could be one, as it refers 
to the degree to which organizational and societal institutional practices encourage and reward 
collective action, but does not get support from our findings. On the other hand, as Simons (1995) 
argues, managers use interactive controls to cope with strategic uncertainties. It may be that 
cultures high in uncertainty avoidance put high emphasis on mechanisms assisting in identifying 
and coping with unceratinties. Therefore, cultures high in uncertainty avoidance could be likely 
candidates for using budgets and / or PMS interactively. Anglo-Saxon SBUs using budgets and 
PMS more interactively than Nordic SBUs is inconsistent with what GLOBE dimensions would 
suggest. One plausible explanation, not related to cultural features as such, may relate back to what 
we reported above. It may be that Nordic SBUs choose to use strategic and action planning systems 
interactively, whereas Anglo-Saxon SBUs rely on interactive use of budgeting and performance 
measurement systems. This would suggest a substitution effect between planning and accounting 
controls when it comes to dealing with strategic uncertainty. This does not, however, explain why 
Anglo-Saxon and Nordic SBUs choose to use different systems interactively.  
It is interesting to note that Nordic SBUs evaluate both leadersip and business performance 
of subordinates more frequently than Anglo-Saxon SBUs. Nordic SBUs use performance 
measurement systems and budgets less interactively, but rely on more frequent formalized 
evaluations of subordinates. In prior management literature, three cultural dimensions (i.e. (in-
group) collectivism, uncertainty avoidance and assertiveness) are suggested to influence 
performance evaluation frequency (Chiang & Birtch, 2010). None of these, nor any other GLOBE 
dimensions, seem to be capable of explaining our findings. Perhaps this could be partly explained 
by differences on how rewards systems are used (see below). Anglo-Saxon SBUs place stronger 
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emphasis on performance-based pay. It may be that timing of these formal evaluations of 
subordinates are somehow linked to how often bonuses are paid. Perhaps in Nordic countries the 
link with these evaluations and bonus pay is not as strong. This is clearly an observation that needs 
further research.  
Prior accounting literature (Harrison, 1993) indicates that power distance and 
individualism is related to the extent that financial performance measures are relied upon in 
performance evaluation. It is argued that low reliance on financial performance measures generates 
more positive outcomes in low power distance/high individualism societies because it implies 
greater incorporation of person- and situation-specific factors into performance evaluation. In our 
study, Anglo-Saxon SBUs rely the most on financial performance measures. Hence, our findings 
appear to be in conflict with those of Harrison (1993), as Anglo-Saxon SBUs scores the lowest on 
power distance. However, power distance may play a role here, but the reasoning may be diffrent 
from Harrison (1993). Delegation of decision rights, driven by differences in power distance, may 
also mean accountability based on financial indicators. Moreover, tThe more extensive use of 
relative performance measures by Anglo-Saxon SBUs, and Nordic compared to Germanic SBUs, 
may also relate to more extensive delegation of decision rights.  
In addition, we find that Germanic SBUs incorporate more individual behaviours, such as 
leadership achievements and individual effort, in performance evaluation than Nordic SBUs. This 
could be related to individualism, but would be difficult to explain by relying on institutional or 
in-group collectivism (see Table 2). Nordic SBUs, on the other hand, held their subordinates 
accountable for a larger number of performance measures than Germanic SBUs. As there are no 
differences compared to Anglo-Saxon SBUs, this finding is not easily explained by any GLOBE 
cultural dimension. It could be that assessing the individual behaviours of subordinates serves as 
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a substitute for holding subordinates accountable for some performance measures. Again, this 
would not allow us to explain why a certain method is used in a certain region; however, this might 
suggest there is more than one option available to resolve certain control problems. As GLOBE 
cultural dimensions appear unable to explain these choices, further reseach is required to provide 
explanation. 
Finally, despite many differences in cultural traits between studied regions, we find all 
regions rely on similar practices in relation to the use of detailed and aggregate measures in 
evaluating subordinate performance.  
 
4.1.5 Reward and compensation  
Results reported in Table 10 show that there are also differences in how reward and compensation 
systems are used in different cultural regions. First, emphasis on performance-based pay is higher 
in Anglo-Saxon SBUs compared to Nordic and Germanic SBUs (p < 0.001). For the proportion of 
incentive pay out of total annual compensation to subordinates, we find no significant differences 
between regions.11 Second, Nordic and Anglo-Saxon SBUs rely more heavily on financial rewards 
than Germanic SBUs (p < 0.01). Third, Anglo-Saxon SBUs also use non-financial rewards more 
than SBUs in the two other cultural regions, and Germanic SBUs use non-financial rewards more 
compared to Nordic SBUs (p < 0.001). Fourth, Anglo-Saxon SBUs emphasize more non-financial 
measures in determining subordinate compensation than Germanic and Nordic SBUs (p < 0.01). 
Fifth, Anglo-Saxon SBUs use both subjectivity (p < 0.001) as well as predetermined quantitive 
targets (p < 0.05) in determining subordinate compensation more than Germanic and Nordic SBUs. 
                                                 
11 The mean proportion in the Anglo (Germanic, Nordic) SBUs is 25% (23%, 19%). 
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Reward and compensation systems can be used for different purposes, including 
motivating subordinates, directing their attention, and committing them to the organization. We 
asked how important these purposes are for financial and non-financial rewards. The vast majority 
of the SBUs studied regarded all of these purposes important. However, Anglo-Saxon and 
Germanic SBUs perceive commitment as more important than Nordic SBUs (p < 0.001). For 
motivating and directing attention, we found no significant differences between regions. 
 
<Insert Table 10 about here> 
 
SBUs in all regions use incentive systems, but place different emphases on different aspects 
of them. Prior literature has attributed the more extensive use of incentive systems to 
individualism. Perhaps stronger emphasis on performance-based pay by Anglo-Saxon SBUs can 
be explained by higher individualism. Scales related to individusalism at GLOBE research, i.e., 
institutional collectivism and in-group collectivism can not explain this finding as the Anglo-
Saxon region sits in between Nordic and Germanic regions in these dimensions. The other 
plausible explanations are lower uncertainty avoidance in Anglo-Saxon SBUs as well as more 
extensive delegation of decision-rights, driven by differences in power distance.  
In prior literature individualism and power distance have been found to be positively 
associated, and uncertainty avoidance negatively related, to the proportion of variable 
compensation (Chiang & Birtch, 2007; Tosi & Greckhamer, 2004). Despite differences in power 
distance and uncertainty avoidance between the three regions we study, no significant variation in 
the amount of variable compensation is observed.  
Commented [DB3]: Don’t think this adds much. Reject 
change if you disagree. 
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Due to their higher assertiveness, Germanic and Anglo-Saxon SBUs could be expected to 
rely more on financial rewards than Nordic SBUs (Merchant et al., 2011). We find that Anglo-
Saxon and Nordic SBUs rely more on financial rewards than Germanic SBUs. Although 
differences in humane orientation are in line with differences in the use of financial rewards, it is 
diffult to come up with convincing arguments why humane orientation would drive these choices. 
Perhaps individualism could better explain differences in financial rewards than assertiveness or 
humane orientation (Fischer, 2004; Giacobbe-Miller et al., 1998; Gooderham et al., 2006). 
Similarly, we could expect Nordic SBUs to have a higher preference for non-financial rewards 
because of their lower assertiveness; however, we find Anglo-Saxon SBUs relying most on non-
financial rewards, followed by Germanic SBUs, and Nordic using them the least. Some prior 
literature suggest the use of non-financial rewards may be related to lower power distance (Chiang 
& Birtch, 2012). Our findings do not provide support. Hence, our findings cast some doubts on the 
usefulness of masculinity / assertiveness to explain the type of rewards, and power distance to 
explain the use of non-financial rewards. GLOBE scales used in this study are unable to suggest 
alternative cultural traits to explain these differences. 
The findings of Jansen et al. (2009) imply that SBUs in Nordic regions, as relatively non-
assertive, base their rewards to a greater extent on non-financial criteria. However, we find that 
Anglo-Saxon SBUs, scoring in the middle in terms of assertiveness, use non-financial criteria more 
than Germanic and Nordic SBUs. Anglo-Saxon SBUs’ more extensive use of predetermined, 
quantitative targets, subjective determination of subordinate compensation, and reliance on non-
financial criteria compared to SBUs in other regions, is difficult to explain through uncertainty 
avoidance; in which Anglo-Saxon region score lower than Germanic and Nordic regions. These 
differences in incentive determination may instead be related to Anglo-Saxon SBUs’ stronger 
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emphasis on performance-based pay. An alternative explanation may relate to low power distance 
(and delegation of decision rights), although we do not find differences between Germanic and 
Nordic SBUs, despite differences in power distance in these regions. 
When it comes to why reward and compensation systems are used, perhaps in performance 
oriented cultures, such as Anglo-Saxon and Germanic cultures, individuals are more likely to 
change firms to find new challenges and to develop their competences. It may be that in such 
cultures reward and compensation systems are used more to help people commit to an organization 
than in cultures scoring lower in performance orientation. This use of reward and compensation to 
commit employees to an organisation may also be linked to the extent non-financial rewards, such 
as promotions, are used.  
 
4.1.6 Cultural controls  
Results reported in Table 11 show that job rotation is a requirement for promotions to a 
higher extent in Anglo-Saxon and Nordic SBUs compared to Germanic SBUs (p < 0.001). With 
regard to a preference for internal promotions, we found no significant differences. We find that 
alignment with organizational values in recruitment decisions for managerial positions is more 
important in Nordic than in Anglo-Saxon and Germanic SBUs (p < 0.01). Anglo-Saxon SBUs, 
however, connect leadership-based performance to promotions and rewards more than Germanic 
SBUs, and these to a larger extent than Nordic SBUs do (p < 0.001). The cultural region also has 
an effect on the extent to which SBUs use socialization activities, such as social events and 
mentoring programs. Socialization is used to a higher extent in Anglo-Saxon SBUs to influence 
subordinates behavior compared to Nordic SBUs, and in these to a larger extent than in Germanic 
SBUs (p < 0.001). No significant differences were found with regard to the extent that SBU top 




<Insert Table 11 about here> 
 
Prior literature provides some evidence that uncertainty avoidance is associated with an 
emphasis on internal promotions (Fukuda, 1992). However, we find no differences between lower 
uncertainty avoidance cultures (Anglo-Saxon) and higher uncertainty avoidance cultures 
(Germanic and Nordic) with regard to the importance of internal promotions. The higher degree 
to which rotation between multiple positions is required for promotion in Anglo-Saxon and Nordic 
regions may relate to SBUs in these regions scoring higher in humane orientation than Germanic 
SBUs. Rotation allows subordinates to understand various functions and associated challenges, 
building ability to appreciate others viewpoints. It is also likely to create feelings of belonging to 
an organization as a whole, fostering caring of others. Hence, we may argue cultures high on 
humane orientation are more likely to use rotation than cultures low in humane orientation. 
The extent to which leadership performance is connected to rewards and promotions is 
difficult to explain by any cultural traits. However, Anglo-Saxon BSBUs scoring highest can easily 
be associated with their higher emphasis on performance-based pay, use of subjectivity in 
performance evaluation, as well as higher weight placed on non-financial performance measures 
in determining compensation. Germanic SBUs scoring higher than Nordic, in turn, is consistent 
with their higher use of individual behaviours (such as leadership performance) in performance 
evaluation, as well as their higher use of non-financial rewards such as promotions. The different 
emphasis placed on socialization processes (e.g., training, social events, mentoring) to reinforce 
SBU values and beliefs among SBUs might relate to the extent SBUs delegate decision rights. In 




4.2. Further analysis of Iinterdependencies between MC practices in cultural regions 
To explore whether and how MC practices are interdependent in different cultural regions, 
we follow the demand approach to complementarity (Grabner & Moers, 2013). As culture at a 
supra-national level tends to be relatively stable over long periods of time, we assume that most 
firms in our sample will have been able to adapt MC practices to local conditions. As such, we 
follow the demand approach to complementarity (Grabner & Moers, 2013). Consistent with prior 
research, we examine the correlation of residuals derived from regressions in which the dependent 
variables are each of the MC practices and the independent variables the covariates used in the 
ANCOVA models describe in Section 4.1 (Grabner, 2014). These covariates represent the main 
contingency factors, apart from culture, likely to influence the MC practices of a firm (Chenhall, 
2003). The residual and correlation analyses are run conducted on each cultural region separately. 
Given the potentially large number of associations, we limit our analysis to those MC 
practices where cultural traits provided insufficient explanation as to why MC practices varied 
between cultural contexts. Futhermore, given the exploratory nature of our study, we report only 
correlations that are significant at p < 0.05 and have moderate effect sizes (r > |0.3|) (Cohen, 1988). 
Correlations for the Anglo-Saxon, Germanic and Nordic cultural region samples are reported in 
Tables 12, 13 and 14 respectively. Significant positive correlations indicate suggest a 
complementary association between MC practices, while significant negative association provides 
evidence indicates that the MC practices are substitutes (Grabner & Moers, 2013). Statistical 
differences between correlation coefficients of different cultural regions are calculated using the 
Fisher transformation. We report conditional correlations which are significant on a p-level of 




relevance of our findings. Absolute values of correlations above |0.1| indicate small, above |0.3| 
indicate moderate and above |0.5| indicate large interdependencies (Cohen, 1988). 
 
<Insert Table 12 about here> 
<Insert Table 13 about here> 
<Insert Table 14 about here> 
 
All cultural regions exhibit complementary associations between the delegation of 
strategic, business and operational decisions, however the association is stronger in Anglo-Saxon 
SBUs than for those in Germanic or Nordic contexts. Our prior results indicated that Anglo-Saxon 
SBUs make greater use of matrix structures, although there was no clear reason, based on cultural 
traits, as to why this should be the case. The results of Table 12 indicate that delegation of strategic 
decisions and matrix structures are complements, suggesting that matrix structures are indirectly 
related to power distance as they are likely to be used simultaneously with higher levels of strategic 
delegation in Anglo-Saxon SBUs. Using multiple lines of authority may allow for greater 
monitoring of subordinates, which is particularly important when they have authority over key 
strategic decisions. Variation in the stability and diversity of management teams was also difficult 
to explain by referring to cultural traits. However, there were no significant interdependencies that 
would provide further insight into these variations.  
Our prior analysis revealed that Anglo-Saxon SBUs placed greater emphasis on the 
interactive use of budgets and performance measures than Nordic SBUs, but this was opposite to 
what might be expected based on the higher uncertainty avoidance of Nordic culture. A partial 
explanation is found in the results of Table 12. Matrix structures are positively associated with the 
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interactive use of both these practices. An interactive use may provide greater structure and focus 
to the more intensive communication associated with matrix structures. An interesting finding is 
that there is a significant positive association between the diagnostic and interactive use of budgets, 
as well as between the diagnostic and interactive use of performance measures, in all three cultural 
contexts. This finding contributes to prior literature that has revealed the positive effects of 
dynamic tension created through using MC practices in both diagnostic and interactive ways (e.g., 
Bedford, 2015; Henri, 2006), by demonstrating that the effect holds across multiple cultural 
contexts. The association for performance measures is strongest in Germanic and Nordic contexts, 
while the association for budgets is strongest for Anglo-Saxon SBUs. Additionally, the association 
between the interactive use of budgets and the interactive use of performance measures is positive 
and significant in all three cultural contexts. This suggests that there are benefits to firms of using 
more than on MC practice interactively, contradicting the claims of Simons (1995) that firms will 
tend to designate only a single MC practice as an interactive control mechanism. 
Interdependencies associated with delegation and matrix structures may provide insight 
into findings related to rewards and compensation. The prior analysis showed that Anglo-Saxon 
firms place greater emphasis on the use of performance-based pay, but this did not align as 
expected to variation in relevant cultural dimensions. Results indicates that delegation of all three 
decision types is positively associated with performance-based pay as well as the use of financial 
rewards in Anglo-Saxon SBUs, but not in Germanic or Nordic SBUs. Prior research indicates that 
delegation and incentive design are interrelated (e.g., Abernethy et al., 2004; Nagar, 2002; Moers, 
2006). Our results suggest that this association may not hold for non-Anglo-Saxon Western 
cultures. We also find that delegation of strategic decisions is positively associated with both the 
use of subjectivity and quantitative targets in incentive pay determination for Anglo-Saxon SBUs, 
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while matrix structures are positively associated with subjectivity and the use of non-financial 
rewards.  
 
A few of the variations between cultural MC practices did not align to expectations based 
on cultural traits. We find that the emphasis on leadership in promotion decisions is also positively 
related to matrix structures and the interactive use of budgets and performance measures, in Anglo-
Saxon SBUs. This provides a potential explanation for the greater emphasis on promotions based 
on leadership in Anglo-Saxon firms, although positive associations are also found with the use of 
financial rewards in all cultural contexts, and performance-based pay in Anglo-Saxon and Nordic 
cultural contexts.  
Anglo-Saxon SBUs complement delegation of decision rights more than Germanic and Nordic 
SBUs: all correlations between delegation of strategic, business and operational decisions are 
higher – with large effects of r > |0.5| – than SBUs in the Nordic or Germanic Regions (see Table 
12). Furthermore, Anglo-Saxon SBUs extensively link other MC practices with delegation of 
decision rights. For instance, delegation of strategic and operational decisions complements with 
the use of multiple reporting lines (matrix structure). Additionally, if management teams in the 
Anglo-Saxon SBUs meet more frequently then we find more delegation of decision rights. This 
clearly indicates that these meetings are participative in nature and thus will to some degree 
trigger delegation of decision rights. Because of their relative lower uncertainty avoidance and 
higher in-group collectivism managers of Anglo-Saxon SBUs tend to rely more on practices that 
are less formalized and more team oriented. Therefore, they not only practice them more than 
managers in Nordic and German SBUs, but combine them in order to leverage their effects on 
participation. 




<Insert Table 12 about here> 
 
Further intriguing results show Anglo-Saxon SBUs to link their delegation of decision rights to 
performance measurement and to reward and compensation. The extensive use of multiple 
reporting lines is complemented with a higher interactive use of budgets and performance 
measurement systems (moderate effect, r > |0.3|) (see Table 13). Although we find no correlation 
between interactive use of budgets/performance measurement systems and delegation of strategic 
decisions, there is an indirect link between them because multiple reporting lines complement 
delegation of strategic decisions. It seems likely that managers of Anglo-Saxon SBUs follow 
Simon’s (1995) idea to engage in interactive use of MC practices if communication about 
strategic issues is important. This fosters our cultural explanations in the previous paragraph 
because these Anglo-Saxon managers foster participation due to their low uncertainty avoidance 
and higher in-group collectivism. In contrast to Anglo-Saxon SBUs, Germanic SBUs substitute 
multiple reporting lines with interactive use of performance measurement systems (small effect, r 
> |0.1|). This could be influenced by higher uncertainty avoidance and assertiveness of German 
managers which could lead to their reluctance to engage in interactive use with their 
subordinates. 
 
<Insert Table 13 about here> 
 
The more Anglo-Saxon SBUs delegate business decisions the less they use financial measures to 
evaluate subordinates (See Table 14). However, this does not imply that rewards are not 
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financial. On the contrary, all three types of delegation of decision rights are complemented by 
use of financial rewards and by an emphasis on performance-based pay (all moderate effects, r > 
|0.3|). In Germanic SBUs, delegation of strategic and operational decisions is complemented by 
the use of financial rewards to compensate their subordinates (all small effects, r > |0.1|). 
Additionally, managers in Germanic SBUs complement these two delegation practices with 
proportion of incentive bonus (all small effects, r > |0.1|). As we did not find the same 
complementarities in Nordic SBUs we are confident that our speculation about our findings in 
the section “Rewards and compensation” are furthered by these results for Anglo-Saxon and 
Germanic cultures: Performance orientation may again be a relevant factor to explain these 
differences because this cultural dimension is higher in Anglo-Saxon and Germanic cultures than 
in Nordic cultures. 
 
<Insert Table 14 about here> 
 
Another important finding indicates that Anglo-Saxon SBUs complement their emphasis on 
multiple reporting lines with a variety of MC practices (see Table 15). It is accompanied with a 
higher number of management levels below top management participating in setting strategic 
plan ends (moderate effect, r > |0.3|) and means (small effect, r > |0.1|), a higher level of use of 
relative measures for benchmarking and evaluating subordinate performance, a higher level of 
frequency of formalized evaluations of leadership performance, a higher degree of subjectivity of 
subordinate compensation, a higher level of use of non-financial rewards (all moderate effects, r 
> |0.3|) and cultural controls show a higher level of internal against external promotion (small 
effect, r > |0.1|), a higher level of job rotation for promotion and a higher level of leadership 
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performance to rewards and promotion (all moderate effects, r > |0.3|). Additionally, an emphasis 
on socialization processes to reinforce values complements the matrix structure (moderate effect, 
r > |0.3|). Managers in Anglo-Saxon SBUs seem to be well aware of the inherent conflicts that 
come with matrix structures and, thus, they heavily complement this structure with cultural 
controls to align all subordinates to the same set of values and beliefs. As our results for the 
matrix structure revealed that managers in Anglo-Saxon SBUs have a higher level of multiple 
reporting lines compared to Nordic SBUs, and Nordic compared to Germanic SBUs, our findings 
about complementarities corroborate these findings. Although we find similar conditional 
correlations in Nordic SBUs, all have a lower value than in Anglo-Saxon SBUs. For instance, 
Nordic SBUs complement matrix structures with a higher level of use of relative measures for 
benchmarking and evaluating subordinate performance, a higher degree of subjectivity of 
subordinate compensation, a higher level of job rotation for promotion, higher emphasis on 
socialization processes to reinforce to reinforce values and beliefs of the SBU and higher 
emphasis of vision statements to foster objectives and purposes of the SBU (all small effects, r > 
|0.1|). Germanic SBUs, with the lowest level of matrix structures, don`t seem to show the 
slightest inclination to foster multiple reporting lines. The use of predetermined, quantitative 
targets in determining subordinate rewards, emphasis on alignment with SBU values, emphasis 
of internal against external promotion and emphasis of vision statements to foster objectives and 
purposes of the SBU are all substitutes to matrix structures (all small effects, r > |0.1|). However, 
two practices are complements to matrix structures: the degree of autonomy that subordinates 
have to set short-term targets for ends and the use of non-financial rewards to compensate 
subordinates (all small effects, r > |0.1|). Overall, managers in Germanic SBUs with their high 
uncertainty avoidance combined with high assertiveness use several MC practices to substitute 
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effects of multiple reporting lines. Whereas Anglo-Saxon and Nordic SBUs use cultural controls 
to foster effects of matrix structures and work against their shortcomings, Germanic SBUs seem 
to establish MC practices which solely rely on formalized planning procedures and rewards. 
 
<Insert Table 15 about here> 
 
Another interesting finding is the substitution between frequency of strategic plan means 
revision, action plan revisions, frequency of revising short-term resource commitments and 
regular meetings within the Anglo-Saxon SBUs (see Table 16). With higher frequencies of 
meetings within the SBUs we see less frequent reviews and revisions of these planning practices. 
It seems that these meetings are used to coordinate reviews and revisions in an informal way on a 
day-to-day basis (all small effects, r > |0.1|). We find no significant correlation for these relations 
in Nordic and Germanic SBUs. As we found a tendency that Anglo-Saxon revise and review less 
frequent than Germanic and Nordic SBUs, which we explained with a lower uncertainty 
avoidance of Anglo-Saxon managers, this should again help to explain these findings: Anglo-
Saxon SBUs with their highly participative management style use teams to do a lot of the 
reviewing and revision of plans. This is influenced by high in-group collectivism combined with 
low uncertainty avoidance which leads to a reliance on teams and a lower frequency of revisions 
and reviews.  
 




Our analysis of the specificity of strategic planning revealed no differences between our cultural 
regions. However, analyzing interdependencies with other MC practices reveals a somewhat 
different picture (see Table 17). Anglo-Saxon SBUs complement the use of more specific 
strategic plans – which means there are more detailed, accurate and documented strategic plan in 
ends and means – with a variety of MC practices. SBUs which use more specific strategic plans 
complement this with higher specificity in action plans; however, they substitute this with less 
frequency of action plans and resources. Moreover, they complement them with a higher use in 
interactive use of budgets and performance measurement systems (moderate effect, r > |0.3|) as 
well as a more diagnostic use of budgets (large effect, r > |0.5|). A more specified strategic plan 
has to be communicated and discussed within performance measurements and budgeting 
procedures. The picture in Germanic SBUs is somewhat similar and different. First, managers in 
this region complement specificity with a higher level of management levels which participate in 
strategic planning (means and ends) (all small effects, r > |0.1|). Second, they complement 
interactive as well as diagnostic use of budgets and performance measurement systems 
(moderate effect, r > |0.3|) with specific strategic plans (small effect, r > |0.1|). Finally, Nordic 
SBUs do add to this picture. They complement diagnostic use of budgets and interactive as well 
as diagnostic use of performance measurement systems with specific strategic plans (all small 
effects, r > |0.1|). Conditional correlations are highest in Anglo-Saxon SBUs and lowest in 
Nordic SBUs. Overall, these results suggest that managers in Anglo-Saxon SBUs efficiently use 
trade-offs between strategic and action plans. If they deploy more specific strategic plans then it 
is useful to less review and revise action plans. Due to their higher uncertainty avoidance 
managers in Germanic and Nordic SBUs shy away from using less reviews and revision of 
action plans. However, Germanic SBUs establish several MC practices to complement the 
51 
 
specificity of strategic plans: they engage more management levels to participate and foster 
interactive use of MC practices. Both initiatives conform to the use of more formalized 
organizational means to cope with uncertainty avoidance of Germanic managers.  
 
<Insert Table 17 about here> 
 
As we could not find differences in the use of belief systems between the cultural regions, we 
analyzed the interdependencies between the use of belief systems and other MC practices. 
Several patterns occurred. First, all SBUs complement value statements and vision statements 
(all large effects, r > |0.5|) (see Table 18). Second, whereas Nordic SBUs complement both 
statements with socialization which aims to reinforce values and beliefs (all moderate effects, r > 
|0.3|), Germanic SBUs complement only value statements with socialization (small effect, r > 
|0.1|) and Anglo-Saxon SBUs complement only vision statements with socialization (moderate 
effect, r > |0.3|). Anglo-Saxon managers may think that socialization as an indirect approach is 
sufficient to influence subordinates on common values and beliefs. This is corroborated by the 
missing complement to the selection and promotion based on values which we find in Nordic 
SBUs (small effect, r > |0.1|). However, overall we do find substantial different patterns of 
complements inside cultural controls between Nordic SBUs, on the one side, and Anglo-Saxon 
and Germanic SBUs, on the other side. Nordic SBUs complement almost all of the practices in 
this subsystem of MCS with each other, whereas Anglo-Saxon and Germanic SBUs complement 
only selected practices. It may well be that the culture of consensus with low assertiveness and a 




<Insert Table 18 about here> 
 
Furthermore, we analyzed how the degree to which leadership performance is connected to 
rewards and promotions – a cultural control practice – is linked to the practices of performance 
measurement and evaluation. Anglo-Saxon SBUs complement this cultural practice with an 
interactive use of budgets (large effect, r > |0.5|) and performance measurement system and with 
a diagnostic use of budgets (all moderate effects, r > |0.3|) (see Table 19). Furthermore, they 
complement non-financial measures (small effect, r > |0.1|), aggregate measures and individual 
behavior for evaluating subordinates (all moderate effects, r > |0.3|). Nordic SBUs have a similar 
pattern. They complement this cultural practice with an interactive and a diagnostic use of 
budgets and performance measurement system (all small effects, r > |0.1|). Furthermore, they 
complement individual behavior for evaluating subordinates (moderate effect, r > |0.3|), the use 
of relative measures and the frequency of formalized evaluations to assess leadership 
performance of subordinates (all small effect, r > |0.1|). Germanic SBUs do not follow these 
patterns and use only one practice as a complement: use of aggregate measures (small effect, r > 
|0.1|). Overall, this corroborates that Anglo-Saxon SBUs emphasize leadership performance 
more than Nordic and Germanic SBUs and, thus, they complement this emphasis with a variety 
of practices in performance measurement and evaluation. However, although Germanic SBUs 
emphasize leadership performance more than Nordic SBUs, the latter complement this more 
clearly with practices in performance measurement. It may be that Germanic SBUs tend to more 
rely on formal structures and procedures. One hint could be that only in this region the emphasis 
on leadership performance to promote and reward subordinates is complemented with delegation 
of strategic, business and operational decisions rights to subordinates – which are prototypical 
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for formalized structures and this could be due to the high uncertainty avoidance in Germanic 
SBUs.  
 
<Insert Table 19 about here> 
 
5.0 Discussion 
We have analyzed how a broad set of management control practices varies across three cultural 
regions and provided tentative explanations for observed differences based on GLOBE research 
cultural dimensions. Out of these three cultural regions, the Germanic and Nordic have not been 
studied extensively before. Similarly, many of the MC practices included in this study have not 
been addressed in prior cross-cultural research.  
Our finding that Anglo-Saxon SBUs delegate decision rights more extensively than other 
regions studied is in line with prior research focusing mainly on Asian and Anglo-Saxon cultures. 
Prior research has attributed these differences to power distance (Harrison et al., 1994; Williams 
& Seaman, 2001). Our results also suggest variation in emphasis on performance-based pay, use 
of financial performance measures, and use of financial rewards, could be linked to delegation of 
decision rights and hence to power distance. A large number of previously unstudied MC 
characteristics in cross-cultural research – use of matrix organizations, boundary systems, diversity 
of management team composition, strategic planning participation, relative performance 
measurement and socialization practices may also be linked to delegation. Hence, our results 
provide support for power distance to be a major cultural trait explaining MC choices, as a number 




In addition to power distance, prior literature has relied on individualism as a cultural trait 
to explain variation in MC practices. We found many differences in performance evaluation, and 
reward and compensation practices, including Anglo-Saxon SBUs relying more on financial 
performance measures in evaluating subordinate performance, their stronger emphasis on 
performance-based pay, and the higher extent of subjectivism in rewarding their subordinates, all 
of which are attributed to higher individualism in prior literature (Bae et al., 1998; Newman & 
Nollen, 1996; Schuler & Rogovsky, 1998). Scales related to individusalism at GLOBE research, 
i.e., institutional collectivism and in-group collectivism, do not provide explanations for these 
findings. As the way we assess individualism is different to prior studies, it is difficult to make any 
claims regarding the influence of individualism on MC variation between cultural regions. In 
general, institutional and in-group collectiveness do not appear to be able to explain the differences 
in MC practices between Western cultural regions. However, we discussed whether in-group 
collectivism could explain stability of management team compositions, and whether institutional 
collectivism could be related to more frequent updating of short-term targets. 
Prior literature has also relied on masculinity and uncertainty avoidance in explaining MC 
variation. For example, prior literature has explained the variation in type of rewards by 
masculinity (Chiang & Birtch, 2006, 2012). Assertiveness, a cultural dimension based on GLOBE 
most closely related to masculinity, does not seem able to explain our findings regarding the type 
of rewards. Neither Chow et al. (1999) nor Van der Stede (2003) found support for masculinity to 
explain financial rewards either. In our study, we suggeted the frequent updates of short-term 
targets may relate to lower assertiveness. While uncertainty avoidance has been linked to internal 
promotions in prior studies (Fukuda, 1992), we do not find differences in internal promotions 
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between regions. We relied on uncertainty avoidance in building tentative explanations for the 
comprehensiveness of strategic planning as well as emphasis on performance-based pay. 
Two GLOBE dimensions used in this study, performance orientation and humane 
orinentation, have not been used before in accounting and management control literature. We 
developed arguments in favour of performance orientation, explaining differences in the use of 
pre-action reviews and how reward systems are used for committing people to the SBU. Likewise, 
we argued humane orientation could have an impact on how rotation is used for promotions. 
We observed a number of differences in MC practices, most of which have not been studied 
in cross-cultural research before, which could not easily be associated with any cultural trait. These 
include frequency related observations – strategy review frequency, frequency to update resource 
commitments, interactive use of budgets and PMS, and business and leadership performance 
evaluation frequency. Differences also related to many performance evaluation and reward 
practices – use of individual behaviours for evaluating subordinate performance, accountability 
for a large number of performance measures, incentive determination (subjectivity, objective 
targets, weight placed on non-financial criteria), and how leadership performance is connected to 
rewards. We controlled for a large number of traditional contingencies and other factors – these 
do not provide explanations for the differences either.  
If an observed variation in any one MC practice cannot be explained by culture, or any 
other common firm or environment level factor, it may be that this MC is determined by, or jointly 
determined with some other management control. This would indicate that, to understand variation 
in some MC features, we need to understand how they form and interact as systems. We analysed 
interdependencies of those MC practices we found to vary between cultural regions, but which we 
could not explain by cultural traits. We found many complementary relations, but also substitutes. 
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Some interdependencies seem to hold across cultural regions, but certain associations appear to be 
dependent on the cultural context of the SBU. There appears to be more interdependencies between 
frequency related controls as well as performance evaluation and reward practices among Anglo-
Saxon cultural region compared to Germanic and Nordic region. 
One way to try to make sense of this variation between cultural regions, not explained by 
culture or other factors we controlled for, relies on the idea of equifinality (Bedford et al., 2016). 
Equifinality means that there exist alternative, equally effective ways of dealing with some control 
problems. In empirical data, variation in one MC between the regions is matched by a counter 
variation in another MC practice, both dealing with the same control problem. We discussed 
Germanic SBUs using individual behaviors for evaluating subordinates performance, and Nordic 
holding subordinates accountable for a large number of measures, being potentially two alternative 
ways of dealing with the same control problem. If a firm uses one of them, there is no need to put 
heavy emphasis on the other. This does not, of course, provide any explanation why certain MC 
practices prevail as the primary choice in a certain region. We alluded already towards this type of 
reasoning above while discussing how certain controls might relate to delegation of decision rights. 
Similarly, the use of subjectivity in performance evaluation, greater weight on non-financial 
performance measures in determining compensation, and the extent to which leadership 
performance is connected to rewards and promotions, may well be linked to each other, as well as 
the extent to which performance-based pay is relied on. It is also intriguing to think, based on 
findings regarding Nordic SBUs, whether strategic planning comprehensiveness, strategic plan 
review frequency, frequent update of short-term targets and resource commitments, and frequent 




One way to try to make sense of this variation between regions, not explained by culture 
or other factors we controlled for, relies on the idea of equifinality (Bedford et al., 2016). 
Equifinality means that there exist alternative, equally effective ways of dealing with some control 
problems. In empirical data, variation in one MC between the regions is matched by a counter 
variation in another MC practice, both dealing with the same control problem. We discussed 
Germanic SBUs using individual behaviors for evaluating subordinates performance, and Nordic 
holding subordinates accountable for a large number of measures, being potentially two alternative 
ways of dealing with the same control problem. If a firm uses one of them, there is no need to put 
heavy emphasis on the other. This does not, of course, provide any explanation why certain MC 
practices prevail as the primary choice in a certain region. However, these choices could get 
explained by their links to other controls. It could be that Anglo-Saxon SBUs use of budgets and 
PMS more interactively is related to a larger emphasis they place on performance-based pay. As 
performance-based pay requires a lot of formal measurement, it would be economical to use those 
systems interactively. 
Our focus in the analysis has been mainly on differences between the cultural regions. It is 
equally important to understand which practices are similar across regions. These might be 
practices that are culturally independent, a result of institutional or global homogenisation, or those 
that might represent some form of universal best practices, at least among Western societies. The 
frequency of cross-SBU management team meetings, as well as the functional diversity of 
individuals participating in those meetings, seems to be similar in all studied regions. The degree 
of specificity and detail in strategic planning does not seem to vary, and long-term goals and means 
to achive those goals are revised with the same frequency. Subordinates have a similar degree of 
autonomy both in developing action plans and setting targets for short-term ends and means. 
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Action plans seem to be equally comprehensive and specific, and those plans are revised in similar 
intervals in all regions. These results are in line with Collins, Holzmann and Mendoza (1996), who 
suggest that budgetary practices may be similar across cultures. Diagnostic use of both budgets 
and performance measurement systems, non-financial measures, and detailed and aggregate 
measures for evaluating subordinate performance, are the same across regions. In all regions, 
bonuses are of similar size relative to total annual compensation. Similarly, there is no difference 
regarding the preference to promote external or internal candidates. Furthermore, emphasis on 
value statements to reinforce SBU values and norms, as well as vision statements to reinforce 
objectives and purpose, appears even among studied regions. Again it is important to note that 
these practices are similar despite many differences in cultural traits in these regions.   
Taken together, our findings suggest that differences in a number of MC practices are likely 
related to how they combine as bundles of practices, or as systems, and that these joint choices 
may be explained by cultural factors. The observed empirical patterns in this study provide 
suggestions on MC practices which might be related to each other. The findings do not, however, 
suggest the type of relation, i.e., whether these choices are made simultaneously or sequentially.  
Finally, like in any exploratory research, our explanations are tentative and need to be 
tested and validated in future studies. Similarly, observed differences do not yet suggest any 
normative recommendations regarding local adaptations of controls for firms having operations in 
foreign countries. As Van der Stede (201503) points out, adaptations are costly. Hence, this study 





Our study contributes to the literature in the following ways. First, we reveal empirical 
differences in control practices in SBUs in three different cultural regions, of which the Germanic 
and Nordic have not been studied extensively before. Moreoever, we reveal differences in many 
control practices that have not been studied in cross-cultural research, including planning and 
cultural controls. Second, we provide tentative explanations for observed differences based on 
cultural dimensions from GLOBE research. Third, as part of the observed differences are difficult 
to explain by cultural traits, we suggest that some of these differences are related to other 
management control practices in use. Our findings reveal a number of interdependencies that hold 
across cultural regions, but also demonstrate that certain associations appear to be dependent on 
the cultural context of the SBU. Moreover, observed empirical patterns suggest how some 
practices may be alternatives for one another. Finally, we find a lot of similar control practices 
among studied regions, despite major differences in many cultural traits between them. These 
findings may hint towards some form of best practice – at least in Western societies.  
This study is not without limitations. We relied on a single respondent from each firm and 
their views on MC practices are subjective. However, for many of the MC practices, subjective 
instruments are the only way to gain insights into how controls are designed and used within firms. 
We explained observed differences by cultural dimensions relying on GLOBE research. Although 
we cannot claim that observed differences are by necessity caused by cultural differences, we 
controlled for a large number of factors normally found to be associated with variation in control 
practices. Additional MC variables may have provided further insights to our study. For instance, 
company specific variables not controlled for include business life-cycle position of SBU and age 
of the firm. Further research is needed to confirm or refute these findings, and provide compelling 
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explanations for observed differences. Our analysis of interdependencies was limited to those MC 
practices we could not explain by cultural traits. These MC practices may also have 
interdependencies with MC practices we did not include in our analysis. 
Despite limitations, this study provides a number of avenues to develop cultural theory of 
MC in empirical studies. In addition to examining which cultural dimensions drive MC variation, 
further research can extend our work by assessing the effectivenes of MC packages and systems 
in different cultures. If some MCscontrols are used in a similar fashion in many cultures, how 
should other MCscontrols be used in different cultures to achieve the desired outcomes? Are there 
a number of viable configurations, suggesting equifinality? Or can we identify optimal MC 
combinations for certain cultures, or certain sub-groups of organizations within these cultures? 
Qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) as a method could be applied in these attempts, in addition 
to more conventional methods. It would also be interesting to study a few large multinationals and 
how they either amend, or not, their control practices to local environments, and whether these 
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TABLE Table 1 
Cultural dimensions 
 
Cultural dimension Definition and comparison to Hofstede’s typologya 
Assertiveness Assertiveness is the degree to which individuals in organizations or 
societies are assertive, confrontational, and aggressive in social 
relationships. 
 Hofstede’s Masculinity is positively related to GLOBE Assertiveness as 
practice scale (r = .37, p > .05). 
Power distance Power Distance is the degree to which members of an organization or 
society expect and agree that power should be stratified and concentrated at 
higher levels of an organization or government. 
 Hofstede’s Power Distance is positively related to GLOBE Power Distance 
as practice scale (r = .57, p > .01). 
Institutional collectivism Institutional Collectivism is the degree to which organizational and societal 
institutional practices encourage and reward collective distribution of 
resources and collective action. 
 - 
In-group collectivism In-Group Collectivism is the degree to which individuals express pride, 
loyalty, and cohesiveness in their organizations or families. 
 Hofstede’s Individualism is negatively related to GLOBE In-Group 
Collectivism as practice scale (r = –.82, p > .01). 
Uncertainty avoidance Uncertainty Avoidance is the extent to which members of an organization 
or society strive to avoid uncertainty by relying on established social 
norms, rituals, and bureaucratic practices. 
 - 
Future orientation Future Orientation is the degree to which individuals in organizations or 
societies engage in future-oriented behaviors such as planning, investing in 
the future, and delaying individual or collective gratification. 
 Hofstede’s Long-term Orientation does not correlate with GLOBE Future 
Orientation Scale (r = .03). 
Humane orientation Humane Orientation is the degree to which a collective encourages and 
rewards individuals for being fair, altruistic, generous, caring, and kind to 
others. 
 - 
Performance orientation Performance Orientation is the degree to which a collective encourages and 
rewards group members for performance improvement and excellence. 
 - 
aDefinitions quoted from House and Javidan (2004); note that some of the GLOBE constructs do 
not correspond to any of construct of the Hofstede study. 
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TABLE Table 2 
GLOBE country scores and means for cultural regionsa 
 
Region / Scores AS PD IC IGC UA FO HO PO 
Anglo-Saxon          
Australia 4.28 2.78 4.29 4.17 4.39 4.09 4.28 4.36 
Canada 4.05 4.82 4.38 4.26 4.58 4.44 4.49 4.49 
Mean (sample) 4.17 3.80 4.34 4.22 4.49 4.27 4.39 4.43 
Mean (all countries) 4.14 4.97 4.46 4.30 4.42 4.08 4.20 4.37 
Germanic Europe         
Austria 4.62 4.95 4.30 4.85 5.16 4.46 3.72 4.44 
Belgium*) b  – – – – – – – – 
Germany 4.57 5.28 3.76 4.08 5.21 4.23 3.21 4.23 
Mean (sample) 4.60 5.12 4.03 4.47 5.19 4.35 3.47 4.34 
Mean (all countries) 4.55 4.95 4.03 4.21 5.12 4.40 3.55 4.41 
Nordic Europe         
Denmark 3.80 3.89 4.80 3.53 5.22 4.44 4.44 4.22 
Finland 3.81 4.89 4.63 4.07 5.02 4.24 3.96 3.81 
Norway*)b – – – – – – – – 
Sweden 3.38 4.85 5.22 3.66 5.32 4.39 4.10 3.72 
Mean (sample) 3.66 4.54 4.88 3.75 5.19 4.36  3.92 
Mean (all countries) 3.66 4.54 4.88 3.75 5.19 4.36 4.17 3.92 
         
Difference (sample countries) G>A>N G>N>A N>A>G G>A>N N, G>A G, N>A A, N>G A, G>N 
aAll scores are the societal level from GLOBE (2004): AS = Assertiveness, PD = Power distance, IC = Institutional Collectivism, IGC = In-Group 
Collectivism, UA = Uncertainty avoidance, FO = Future orientation, HO = Humane orientation, PO = Performance orientation; Mean = mean for 
the region based on sample countries; Mean (all countries) = mean for the region based on all GLOBE countries; scores range from 1 = very low 
to 7 = very high. 
*) bNot included in the GLOBE study. 
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TABLE Table 3 
Description of prior studies which have studied the relationship between national culture and MCS        
 
Management control systems Prior research Relevant culture 
dimension(s) and expected 
influence*a 
National cultures and predictions if specified Findings**b 
Administrative controls     
Decentralisation Chow et al. (1999)  Individualism (+) 
Power distance (–) 
US > Japan > Taiwan Not sig. 
Decentralisation  Harrison et al. (1994) Individualism (+) 
Power distance (–) 
Australia and US > Singapore and Hong Kong Sig. 
Decentralisation of human resource 
decision-making authority 
Meyer & Hammerschmid 
(2010) 
Individualism (+) 
Power distance (–) 
Uncertainty avoidance (–) 
European countries  Sig. 
Sig. 
Sig. 
Centralization drives MCS changes Williams & Seaman 
(2001) 
Power distance (+) Singapore Sig. 
Decentralisation in MNCs, home country Williams & van Triest 
(2009) 
Individualism (+) 
Power distance (-) 
Masculinity (-) 
Uncertainty avoidance (-) 
Headquarters in European countries, Israel. Japan, 





Decentralisation in MNCs, host country Williams & van Triest 
(2009) 
Individualism (+) 
Power distance (-) 
Masculinity (-) 
Uncertainty avoidance (-) 
Subsidiaries in European countries, Chile, India, 





Budget control practices Ueno & Sekaran (1992) Collectivism (–) US > Japan Sig. 
Budget control practices 
 
Ueno & Wu (1993) Collectivism (–) US > Japan Sig. 
Rules and procedures 
 
Chow et al. (1994) Uncertainty avoidance (+) Japan > US Sig. 
Rules and procedures 
 
Chow et al. (1996)  Uncertainty avoidance (+) Japan > US Sig. 
Rules and procedures Chow et al. (1999) Collectivism (+) 
Power distance (+) 
Uncertainty avoidance (+) 
Taiwan > Japan  
Japan > US 
Sig. 
Opposite 
Effect of rules on financial performance Newman & Nollen 
(1996) 
Uncertainty avoidance (+) European and Asian countries Not sig. 
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Management control systems Prior research Relevant culture 
dimension(s) and expected 
influence*a 
National cultures and predictions if specified Findings**b 
Formalized control mechanisms in MNCs Jaussaud & Schaaper 
(2006) 
/ Japan subsidiaries in China > European 
subsidiaries in China 
Sig. 
Strategic planning     
Formal strategic planning process Hoffman (2007) Power distance (+) 
Uncertainty avoidance (–) 
Collectivism (–) 
Masculinity (–) 




Action planning     
Success of a top-down implemented ABC 
system 
Brewer (1998)  Power distance (+) 
 
Malaysia > US Sig. 
Budgetary participation 
 
Lau & Eggleton (2004) Power distance (–) Australia > Singapore Sig. 
Budgetary participation Lau & Caby (2010) Collectivism (+) 
Power distance (–) 
Australia, Norway and Singapore > France Sig. 
Budgetary participation  O’Connor (1995) Power distance (–) 
 
Foreign subsidiaries in Singapore > Local 
subsidiaries in Singapore 
Sig. 
Integrative mechanisms for mergers Lubatkin et al. (1998) Power distance (–) 
Uncertainty avoidance (–) 
UK > France Sig. 
Participative work units and performance  Newman & Nollen 
(1996) 
Power distance (–) 
 
European and Asian countries Sig. 
Effect of budgetary participation and 
MAS on managerial performance 
Tsui (2001) Collectivism (–) 
Power distance (–) 
Long-term orientation (–) 
Western managers in China > Chinese managers in 
China 
Sig. 
Participation in goal setting and individual 
performance 
Erez & Earley (1987) Collectivism (+) 
Power distance (–) 




Participation in goal setting and goal 
acceptance 
Erez & Earley (1987)  Israel > US Not sig. 
Effect of budget emphasis, budgetary 
participation and task difficulty on 
managerial performance 
Lau et al. (1995) Collectivism (+) 
Power distance (–) 
 
Singapore = Australia Sig. 
Effect of budget emphasis, budgetary 
participation and task difficulty on 
managerial performance  
Lau et al. (1997) Collectivism (+) 
Power distance (–) 
 
Singapore = Australia (manufacturing industry) Not rejected 
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Management control systems Prior research Relevant culture 
dimension(s) and expected 
influence*a 
National cultures and predictions if specified Findings**b 
Effect of budget emphasis, budgetary 
participation and task difficulty on 
managerial performance  
Lau & Tan (1998) Collectivism (+) 
Power distance (–) 
 
Singapore = Australia (financial services industry) Not rejected 
 
Performance measurement and 
evaluation 
    
Adherence to high-stretch performance 
standards 
Chow et al. (2001) Power distance (+) 
Collectivism (+) 
China > US  Sig. 
Reliance on accounting performance 
measures for evaluation is associated with 
low job tension and high job satisfaction 
Harrison (1993) Power distance (+) 
Individualism (–) 
Singapore > Australia Sig. 
Financial performance measures in 
evaluation 
Hui (1988) Collectivism (+) China > US Sig. 
Headquarters influence on the use of PMS 
on subsidiaries’ decisions  
 
Dossi & Patelli (2008) Collectivism (-) 
Masculinity (-) 
Power distance (-) 
Uncertainty avoidance (-) 
Italian subsidiaries of foreign international 
companies from European countries, US and Japan 
Sig.  
Inclusion of non-financial performance 
measures in PMS used in the relationship 
between headquarters and subsidiaries 
Dossi & Patelli (2010) Individualism (+) 
Masculinity (+) 
Power distance (-) 
Uncertainty avoidance (+) 
Italian subsidiaries of foreign international 
companies from European countries, US, South 
Africa, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Japan 
Sig. 
Financial performance measures in MNCs 
 




Financial performance evaluation criteria  
 
Borkowski (1999) Short-term orientation (+) 
Long-term orientation (-) 
US, UK, Canada = Germany, Japan Not sig. 
Short-term financial performance 
measures  
Carr & Tomkins (1996) / UK > Germany Sig. 
Short-term financial performance 
measures 
Coates et al. (1992) / US, UK > Germany  Sig. 
Short-term financial performance 
measures 
Coates et al. (1995) / US, UK > Germany  Sig. 
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Management control systems Prior research Relevant culture 
dimension(s) and expected 
influence*a 
National cultures and predictions if specified Findings**b 
Non-financial performance measures in 
MNCs 
Chung et al. (2006) / Japan, German > US, UK  Sig. 
 
Performance evaluation subjectivity Myloni et al. (2004) Performance orientation (–) 
Future orientation (–) 
In-group collectivism (+) 
Power distance (+) 
Greek indigenous firms > MNC subsidiaries in 
Greece (Australia, European countries, US and 
Japan) 
Sig. 
Performance evaluation frequency 
 
Chiang & Birtch (2010) Masculinity (+) 
Uncertainty avoidance (+) 
Collectivism (–) 





Performance evaluation time horizon Ueno & Sekaran (1992) Collectivism (+) Japan > US Sig. 
Extrinsic motivation 
Intrinsic motivation 
DeVoe & Iyengar (2004) Individualism (+) 
Collectivism (+) 
US: Extrinsic motivation > Intrinsic motivation 
Asian: Extrinsic motivation = Intrinsic motivation 





Reward and compensation     
Incentive use 
 
Jansen et al. (2009) Masculinity (+) US > the Netherlands Sig. 
Incentive use 
 
Merchant et al. (2011) Masculinity (+) US and China > the Netherlands Sig. 
Incentive use 
 
Awasthi et al. (2001) Collectivism (–) US > China Sig. 
Incentive use Pennings (1993) Collectivism (–) 
Masculinity (+) 
US > France and the Netherlands Sig.  
 
Incentive use Daley et al. (1985) 
 
/ US > Japan Sig. 
Performance-based rewards  Bae et al. (1998) Collectivism (–) American and European subsidiaries in Korea > 
Asian subsidiaries in Korea 
Sig. 
Pay for performance practices Schuler & Rogovsky 
(1998) 
Collectivism (–) 
Uncertainty avoidance (–) 
European countries, US and Israel Sig. 
Not sig. 
Merit-based reward practices Newman & Nollen 
(1996) 




Individual performance in determining 
pay levels 
Schuler & Rogovsky 
(1998) 
Individualism (+) 
Uncertainty avoidance (–) 
European countries, US and Israel Sig. 
Sig. 
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Management control systems Prior research Relevant culture 
dimension(s) and expected 
influence*a 
National cultures and predictions if specified Findings**b 
Long-term incentives 
 
Merchant et al. (1995) Collectivism (–) US > Taiwan Sig. 
Incentive proportion  Chiang & Birtch (2006) Uncertainty avoidance (–) Hong Kong > Finland Not sig. 
Variable compensation Tosi & Greckhammer 
(2004) 
Uncertainty avoidance (–) African, American, Asian and European countries 
and Australia 
Sig. 
Discretionary bonuses  
Formula-based bonuses 
Merchant et al. (2011) Power distance (+) 
Masculinity (+) 
China > US and the Netherlands  
US > China and the Netherlands 
Sig. 
Sig. 
Financial rewarding Giacobbe-Miller et al. 
(1998) 
Collectivism (+) US = Russia Sig. 
 
Financial rewarding Fischer (2004) Collectivism (–) UK > Germany Sig.  
 
Financial rewarding Van der Stede (2003) Individualism (+) 
Power distance (–) 
Uncertainty avoidance (–) 
Masculinity (+) 
Local and foreign (European countries) subsidiaries 





Financial rewarding Chow et al. (1999) Collectivism (–) 
Uncertainty avoidance (–) 
Masculinity (+) 
US > Japan > Taiwan  Not sig. 




Non-financial rewarding Chiang & Birtch (2006) Masculinity (–) 
 
Finland > Hong Kong Sig. 
 
Non-financial rewarding Chiang & Birtch (2012) Masculinity (–) 
Power distance (–) 




Cultural controls     
Staffing control  Chang & Taylor (1999) Uncertainty avoidance (+) Japanese MNCs in Korea > US MNCs in Korea Sig. 
Internal promotion Myloni et al. (2004) Collectivism (+) Greek indigenous firms > MNC subsidiaries in 
Greece (European countries, Japan and US) 
Not sig. 
Internal promotion Bae et al. (1998) / Japanese subsidiaries in Korea > Western 





Faulkner et al. (2002) / Japan (lifetime) > US (short term) 
UK (long term) > US (short term)   
Sig. 
Sig. 
Formal training Faulkner et al. (2002) / US > Japan Sig. 
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Management control systems Prior research Relevant culture 
dimension(s) and expected 
influence*a 
National cultures and predictions if specified Findings**b 
 
Bureaucratic control and organizational 
cultural control 
Snodgrass & Szewczak 
(1990) 
/ Negative relationship between bureaucratic control 
and organizational cultural control in both Japanese 




*aExpected influence indicates the directional predictions for the management control system components: (+) denotes a positive influence, and (–) 
denotes a negative influence.  
**bWe use significant (Sig), not significant (Not sig), opposite and not rejected to indicate the results of the expected influence of national cultures 
and/or predictions in previous research. Note that the indications refer to italic text in either column 3 or 4 or both columns depending on the stated 
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TABLE Table 4 








# Employees Industry 
<1000 >1000 Manu. Serv. Wholes. 
Anglo-Saxon          
Australia 422 50 12% 50 35 15 14 26 10 
Canada 200 52 26% 39 19 20 33 6 0 
Sum 622 102 16% 89 54 35 47 32 10 
Germanic          
Austria 223 51 23% 44 25 19 27 15 2 
Belgium  113 50 44% 40 29 11 25 12 3 
Germany 392 87 22% 76 51 25 38 30 8 
Sum 728 188 26% 160 105 55 90 57 13 
Nordic          
Denmark 163 120 74% 109 67 42 50 43 16 
Finland 183 96 52% 82 45 37 31 33 18 
Norway 87 68 78% 59 44 15 26 28 5 
Sweden 416 120 29% 94 61 33 32 46 16 
Sum 849 404 48% 344 217 127 139 150 55 
Total 2199 694 32% 593 376 217 276 239 78 
(1) aWhere multiple SBUs belonging to the same group were interviewed, only one 
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TABLE Table 5 
Respondent positions by country 
 
Region/Country CEO CFO COO Other Total 
Anglo-Saxon      
Australia 5 30 0 15 50 
Canada 8 12 17 2 39 
Sum 13 42 17 17 89 
Germanic      
Austria 23 7 1 13 44 
Belgium (Flem.) 35 3 2 0 40 
Germany 35 13 0 28 76 
Sum 93 23 3 41 160 
Nordic      
Denmark 22 83 1 3 109 
Finland 31 6 2 43 82 
Norway 9 27 2 21 59 
Sweden 23 57 0 14 94 
Sum 85 173 5 81 344 











TABLE Table 6 
ANCOVA results for administrative controls 
 








Organizational structure      
Delegation of authority      
Strategic decisions Delegation of strategic 
decision authority to 
subordinates 
93.82 40.10 0.000 A>G,N 
Business decisions Delegation of business 
decision authority to 
subordinates 
54.11 18.46 0.000 A>G,N 
Operational decision Delegation of operational 
decision authority to 
subordinates 
36.63 14.38 0.000 A>N>G 
Matrix structures Use of matrix structures 
with multiple lines of 
accountability 
72.61 18.62 0.000 A>N>G 
Management processes      
Team interaction      
Within SBU Frequency that within 
SBU management team 
meetings take place 
4.99 6.04 0.005 A,G>N 
Across SBU Frequency that cross-SBU 
management team 
meetings take plac 
6.21 2.14 0.156  
Team composition      
Stability within SBU Stability of individual 
composition in the SBU 
management teams 
37.46 13.63 0.000 G>A,N 
Stability across SBU Stability of individual 
composition in cross-SBU 
management teams 
47.93 15.25 0.000 G>A,N 
Breadth within SBU Functional diversity of 
individuals in the SBU 
management teams 
61.10 10.23 0.000 A>G,N 
Breadth across SBU Functional diversity of 
individuals in cross-SBU 
management teams 
12.51 2.07 0.161  
Rules and procedures      
Pre-action reviews Emphasis on pre-action 
reviews 
26.83 8.62 0.001 A,G>N 
Boundary systems Emphasis on boundary 
control systems 
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TABLE Table 7 
ANCOVA results for strategic planning 
 








Content      
Comprehensiveness Comprehensiveness 
of the content covered 
by the strategic plan 
22.32 9.50 0.000 N,G>A 
Specificity Degree of specificity 
and detail of strategic 
plan content 
6.53 2.46 0.115  
Review frequency      
Ends Frequency that the 
strategic plan ends are 
reviewed 
468.55 7.50 0.001 N>A,G 
Means Frequency that the 
strategic plan means 
are reviewed 
808.35 11.81 0.000 G,N>A 
Revision frequency      
Ends Frequency that the 
strategic plan ends are 
revised 
76.76 0.72 0.533  
Means Frequency that the 
strategic plan means 
are revised 
300.35 3.08 0.072  
Subordinate 
participation 
     
Ends The number of levels 
of management below 
the top management 
participating in 
setting strategic plan 
ends 
59.13 27.70 0.000 A>G,N 
Means The number of levels 
of management below 
the top management 
participating in 
setting strategic plan 
means 







TABLE Table 8 
ANCOVA results for action planning 
 





Content Degree of 
comprehensiveness and 
specificity of detail of 
action plan content 
0.17 0.12 0.884  
Revision frequency      
Targets Frequency of revising 
short-term performance 
targets 
406.16 10.97 0.000 N>A>G 
Action plans Frequency of revising 
action plans 
25.67 0.89 0.476  
Resource allocations Frequency of revising 
short-term resource 
commitments 
180.89 8.06 0.001 N>G 
Subordinate participation      
Plan development Degree of autonomy that 
subordinates have to 
develop action plans 
1.03 0.49 0.636  
Targets (ends) Degree of autonomy that 
subordinates have to set 
short-term targets for 
ends 
2.42 1.57 0.251  
Targets (means) Degree of autonomy that 
subordinates have to set 
short-term targets for 
means 







TABLE Table 9 
ANCOVA results for performance measurement and evaluation 
 








Budgets      
Diagnostic use Extent to which top 
managers use budgets 
diagnostically 
2.37 0.83 0.487  
Interactive use Extent to which top 
managers use budgets 
interactively 
19.96 7.00 0.002 A>N 
Performance 
measurement systems 
     
Diagnostic use Extent to which top 
managers use performance 
measures diagnostically 
4.92 1.42 0.287  
Interactive use Extent to which top 
managers use performance 
measures interactively 
21.88 6.50 0.003 A>N 
Performance evaluation 
measures 
     
Financial Use of financial measures for 
evaluating subordinate 
performance 
32.44 8.42 0.001 A>N>G 
Non-financial Use of non-financial 
measures for evaluating 
subordinate performance 
7.05 1.82 0.200  
Detailed Use of detailed measures for 
evaluation subordinate 
performance 
2.15 0.44 0.657  
Aggregate Use of aggregate measures 
for evaluation subordinate 
performance 
2.82 0.55 0.610  
Personal Use of individual behaviors 
(e.g., leadership, effort) for 
evaluating subordinate 
performance 
12.98 4.67 0.016 G>N 
Relative Use of relative measures 
(e.g., comparison to internal 
or external benchmarks) for 
evaluating subordinate 
performance 
67.83 20.80 0.000 A>N>G 
Number of measures The number of performance 
measures subordinates are 
held accountable for 
86.17 3.66 0.043 N>G 
Performance evaluation 
frequency 
     
Leadership Frequency of formalized 
evaluations to assess 





leadership performance of 
subordinates 
Business Frequency of formalized 
evaluations to assess business 
performance of subordinates 
1718.61 32.47 0.000 N>G>A 
Performance evaluation 
purpose 
     
Learning Importance of performance 
evaluation to provide 
feedback for subordinate 
learning 
5.89 2.08 0.161  
Compensation Importance of performance 
evaluation to determine 
subordinate compensation 
25.96 5.43 0.008 A>G 
Directing attention Importance of performance 
evaluation to direct 
subordinate attention to 
important issues 

























TABLE Table 10 
ANCOVA results for reward and compensation 
 








Incentive intensity      
Incentive use Emphasis on 
performance-based pay 
61.93 11.68 0.000 A> G,N 
Incentive proportion Proportion of incentive 
bonus out of total annual 
compensation to 
subordinates 
2524.77 2.78 0.090  
Incentive determination      
Subjectivity Use of subjectivity in 
determining subordinate 
compensation 
142.06 27.09 0.000 A>G,N 
Objectivity Use of predetermined, 
quantitative targets in 
determining subordinate 
compensation 
30.95 5.00 0.012 A>G,N 
Non-financial weight Weight placed on non-
financial (versus 
financial) performance 
measures in determining 
subordinate 
compensation 
8928.22 5.76 0.007 A>G,N 
Incentive type      
Financial Use of financial rewards 
(e.g., bonuses) to 
compensate subordinates 
45.40 6.84 0.002 A,N>G 





160.38 30.79 0.000 A>G>N 
Incentive purpose      
Commitment Importance of incentives 
to commit subordinates 
to organization 
108.77 19.03 0.000 A,G>N 
Motivation Importance of incentives 
to increase subordinate 
motivation 
19.13 3.44 0.052  
Directing attention Importance of incentives 
to direct subordinate 
attention to important 
issues 









TABLE Table 11 
ANCOVA results for cultural controls 
 








Selection and promotion      
Based on values Emphasis on alignment 
with SBU values and 
beliefs in selection 
decisions 
34.11 5.36 0.009 N>G,A 
Internal promotions Preference to promote 
internally versus 
external recruitment 
8.68 2.97 0.079  
Job rotation Degree to which 
rotation between 
multiple positions is 
required for promotion 
87.21 18.86 0.000 A,N>G 
Leadership Degree to which 
leadership performance 
is connected to rewards 
and promotions 
120.47 22.26 0.000 A>G>N 
Socialization Emphasis placed on 
socialization processes 
(e.g., training, social 
events, mentoring) to 
reinforce SBU values 
and beliefs 
28.29 12.33 0.000 A>N>G 
Belief systems      
Value statements Emphasis on value 
statements to reinforce 
SBU values and norms 
8.90 2.55 0.110  
Vision statements Emphasis on vision 
statements to reinforce 
SBU objectives and 
purpose 









TABLE Table 12 
Residual correlations for Anglo-Saxon cultural region (n=80)a 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 
Administrative                              
1. Delegation (strat.)                              
2. Delegation (bus.) .61                             
3. Delegation (op.) .60 .74                            
4. Matrix structures .38 ∙ ∙                           
5. Boundary systems ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙                          
Strategic planning                              
6. Content ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙                         
7. Specificity ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ .39                        
8. Review (ends) ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ -.41                       
9. Review (means) ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙                      
Action planning                              
10. Specificity ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ .35 ∙ ∙                     
Perf. measurement                              
11. Budget (diagnostic) ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙                    
12. Budget (interactive) ∙ ∙ ∙ .47 ∙ ∙ .38 ∙ ∙ ∙ .65                   
13. PM (diagnostic) ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ .34 ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙                  
14. PM (interactive) ∙ ∙ ∙ .38 ∙ ∙ .35 ∙ -.35 ∙ .48 .65 .34                 
15. Perf. eval. (financial) ∙ -.34 ∙ ∙ ∙ .33 ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ .37 ∙ ∙ ∙                
16. Perf. eval. (non-fin.) ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ .43 ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙               
17. Perf. eval.  (personal) ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ .31 ∙ -.34 .42 .30 .41 ∙ .44 ∙ ∙              
18. Perf. eval. (relative) ∙ ∙ ∙ .32 ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙             
19. Perf. eval. (# meas.) ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ .33 -.37 ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙            
20. Perf. eval. (leadership) ∙ ∙ ∙ .32 .34 ∙ ∙ .35 .38 ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ -.43           
Incentives                              
21. Perf.-based pay .47 .46 .38 ∙ .38 ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙          
22. Subjectivity .31 ∙ ∙ .32 ∙ ∙ ∙ .35 ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ .42 ∙         
23. Objectivity .32 ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ .33 ∙ ∙ ∙ .35        
24. Financial rewards .33 .35 .32 ∙ .39 ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ .53 ∙ .34       
25. Non-financial rewards ∙ ∙ .31 .36 ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ .38 ∙ .33 ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ .37 ∙ ∙      
Cultural                              
26. Promotion (values) .35 ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙     
27. Promotion (internal) ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ .34 ∙ ∙ ∙ -.41 ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙    
28. Promotion (leadership) ∙ ∙ ∙ .38 ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ .40 .51 ∙ .43 ∙ .36 ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ .34 ∙ ∙ .38 ∙ ∙ ∙   
29. Socialization ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ .32 .40 ∙ .39 .35 ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙  
30. Vision statements ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ .32 ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ .43 ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ .31 







TABLE Table 13 
Residual correlations for Germanic cultural region (n=117)a 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 
Administrative                              
1. Delegation (strat.)                              
2. Delegation (bus.) .43                             
3. Delegation (op.) .33 .50                            
4. Matrix structures ∙ ∙ ∙                           
5. Boundary systems ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙                          
Strategic planning                              
6. Content ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙                         
7. Specificity ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ .35                        
8. Review (ends) ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙                       
9. Review (means) ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ .78                      
Action planning                              
10. Specificity ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙                     
Perf. measurement                              
11. Budget (diagnostic) ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ .32 ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙                    
12. Budget (interactive) ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ .50                   
13. PM (diagnostic) ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙                  
14. PM (interactive) ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ .37 ∙ .36 ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ .36 .68                 
15. Perf. eval. (financial) ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ .34 .33 ∙ ∙                
16. Perf. eval. (non-fin.) ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙               
17. Perf. eval.  (personal) ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ .34 ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙              
18. Perf. eval. (relative) ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙             
19. Perf. eval. (# meas.) ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙            
20. Perf. eval. (leadership) ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙           
Incentives                              
21. Perf.-based pay ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙          
22. Subjectivity ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙         
23. Objectivity ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ .46 ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ -.33        
24. Financial rewards ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙       
25. Non-financial rewards ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ -.32 ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙      
Cultural                              
26. Promotion (values) ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙     
27. Promotion (internal) ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ -.30 ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙    
28. Promotion (leadership) ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ .31 ∙ .40 ∙   
29. Socialization ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ .31 ∙ ∙ .32 ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ .39 .30 ∙ ∙  
30. Vision statements ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ .35 ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ .34 ∙ .30 ∙ 





TABLE Table 14 
Residual correlations for Nordic cultural region (n=268)a 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 
Administrative                              
1. Delegation (strat.)                              
2. Delegation (bus.) .38                             
3. Delegation (op.) .33 .40                            
4. Matrix structures ∙ ∙ ∙                           
5. Boundary systems ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙                          
Strategic planning                              
6. Content ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙                         
7. Specificity ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ .40                        
8. Review (ends) ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙                       
9. Review (means) ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ .71                      
Action planning                              
10. Specificity ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ .33 ∙ ∙ ∙                     
Perf. measurement                              
11. Budget (diagnostic) ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙                    
12. Budget (interactive) ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ .51                   
13. PM (diagnostic) ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙                  
14. PM (interactive) ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ .33 .69                 
15. Perf. eval. (financial) ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙                
16. Perf. eval. (non-fin.) ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ .31 ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ .36 ∙ ∙               
17. Perf. eval.  (personal) ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ .30 ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙              
18. Perf. eval. (relative) ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ .32 ∙ ∙ ∙             
19. Perf. eval. (# meas.) ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙            
20. Perf. eval. (leadership) ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙           
Incentives                              
21. Perf.-based pay ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙          
22. Subjectivity ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙         
23. Objectivity ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ .53 ∙        
24. Financial rewards ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ .30 ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ .61 ∙ .72       
25. Non-financial rewards ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙      
Cultural                              
26. Promotion (values) ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙     
27. Promotion (internal) ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙    
28. Promotion (leadership) ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ .34 ∙ ∙ ∙ .40 ∙ ∙ .36 ∙ ∙ ∙   
29. Socialization ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ .32 ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ .31 ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙  
30. Vision statements ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ .36 ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ .34 ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ .42 
a Only correlations significant at p < 0.05 and medium effect sizes (r > 0.3) are reported. 




APPENDIX Appendix A 
DEFINITION OF VARIABLESVariable definitions 
 
A.1 Administrative controls 




  Delegation of 
authority 
 
   Strategic decisions Delegation of strategic decision authority to subordinates. Reflective construct 
measuring the average of four items based on Abernethy et al. (2004) and Bedford 
and Malmi (2015).   
   Business decisions Delegation of business decision authority to subordinates. Reflective construct 
measuring the average of five items based on Abernethy et al. (2004) and Bedford 
and Malmi (2015).   
   Operational decisions Delegation of operational decision authority to subordinates. Reflective construct 
measuring the average of four items based on Abernethy et al. (2004) and Bedford 
and Malmi (2015).   
 Matrix structure Use of matrix structures with multiple lines of accountability. Reflective construct 
measuring the average of two items based on Burns and Stalker (1961), Chenhall 
and Morris (1995), Simons (2005), Bogsnes (2009), and Rowe, Birnberg and 
Shields (2008) 
Management processes  
  Team interaction   
    Within the SBU Frequency that within SBU management team meetings take place. Single item 
construct based on Malmi and Brown (2015).  
    Across the SBU Frequency that cross-SBU management team meetings take place. Single item 
construct based on Malmi and Brown (2015). 
  Team composition  
    Stability within SBU Stability of individual composition in the SBU management teams. Single item 
construct based on Malmi and Brown (2015). 
    Stability across SBU Stability of individual composition in cross-SBU management teams. Single item 
construct based on Malmi and Brown (2015). 
    Breadth within the  
     SBU 
Functional diversity of individuals in the SBU management teams. Single item 
construct based on Malmi and Brown (2015). 
    Breadth across the   
    SBU 
Functional diversity of individuals in cross-SBU management teams. Single item 
construct based on Malmi and Brown (2015). 
Rules and procedures   
  Pre-action reviews Emphasis on pre-action reviews. Formative construct measuring the average of two 
items based on Simons (1995, 2005), Merchant and Van der Stede (2012), and 
Widener (2008). 
  Boundary system Emphasis on boundary control systems. Formative construct measuring the average 




A.2 Strategic planning 
Construct Variable definition 
Content  
  Comprehensiveness 
 
Comprehensiveness of the content covered by the strategic plan. Formative 
construct measuring the average of two items. 
  Specificity 
 
Degree of specificity and detail of strategic plan content. Reflective construct 
measuring the average of three items based on Brews and Hunt (1999).   
Review frequency  
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  Ends Frequency that the strategic plan ends are reviewed. Single item construct based on 
Brews and Hunt (1999). 
  Means Frequency that the strategic plan means are reviewed. Single item construct based 
on Brews and Hunt (1999). 
Revision frequency  
  Ends Frequency that the strategic plan ends are revised. Single item construct based on 
Brews and Hunt (1999). 
  Means Frequency that the strategic plan means are revised. Single item construct based on 




 Ends The number of levels of management below the top management participating in 
setting strategic plan ends. Single item construct. 
  Means The number of levels of management below the top management participating in 
setting strategic plan means. Single item construct. 
 
 
A.3 Action planning 
Construct Variable definition 
Content Degree of comprehensiveness of action plan content. Formative construct 
measuring the average of seven items.  
Revision frequency  
  Target 
 
Frequency of revising short-term performance targets. Single item construct.  
  Action plans 
 
Frequency of revising action plans. Single item construct. 




  Plan development Degree of autonomy that subordinates have to develop action plans. Single item 
construct based on Bogsnes (2009). 
  Targets ends  
 
Degree of autonomy that subordinates have to set short-term targets for ends. 
Single item construct based on Bogsnes (2009). 
  Targets means Degree of autonomy that subordinates have to set short-term targets for means. 
Single item construct based on Bogsnes (2009). 
 
 
A.4 Performance measurement and evaluation 
Constructs Variable definition 
Budgets  
  Diagnostic use 
 
Measures cybernetic monitoring of activity through deviations from performance 
standards (Simons 1995). The construct is based Simons (1995), Henri (2006), and 
Bedford and Malmi (2015). Reflective construct measured as the average of three 
items. 
  Interactive use The construct is based on a reflective measurement model (five items) developed by 
Bisbe, Batista-Foguet and Chenhall (2007). The wording of the items is based on 





  Diagnostic use 
 
Measures cybernetic monitoring of activity through deviations from performance 
standards (Simons 1995). The construct is based Simons (1995), Henri (2006), and 




  Interactive use The construct is based on a reflective measurement model (five items) developed by 
Bisbe et al. (2007). The wording of the items is based on Simons (1995), Henri 




  Financial  Measures the use of financial measures for evaluating subordinates (Simons, 2005). 
Reflective construct measured as the average of two items.   
  Non-financial Measures the use of non-financial measures for evaluating subordinates (Simons, 
2005). A single item is used to capture the attribute.  
  Detailed Measures the use of detailed measures for evaluating subordinates (Simons, 2005). 
A single item is used to capture the attribute (Simons, 2005; Bogsnes, 2009). 
  Aggregate Measures the use of aggregate measures for evaluating subordinates (Simons, 2005). 
A single item is used to capture the attribute (Simons, 2005; Bogsnes, 2009 ) 
  Personal Measures the use of individual behaviours for evaluating (e.g., leadership, effort) 
subordinate performance. The construct is based on Simons (2005) and 
Kolehmainen (2010). Reflective construct measured as the average of three items. 
  Relative Measuring the use of relative measures (e.g., comparison to internal or external 
benchmarks) for evaluating subordinate performance. Reflective construct measured 
as the average of three items based on Bogsnes (2009). 




  Leadership performance Frequency of formalized evaluation to assess leadership performance of 
subordinates. Single item construct based on Merchant (1989), Kolehmainen (2010) 
and Merchant and Van der Stede (2012).  
  Business performance Frequency of formalized evaluation to assess business performance of subordinates. 
Single item construct based on Merchant (1989), Kolehmainen (2010) and Merchant 
and Van der Stede (2012). 
 
 
A.5 Reward and compensation 
Construct Variable definition 
Incentive intensity  
  Incentive use Emphasis on performance-based pay. Formative construct measured as the average 
of two items based on Simons (2005) and Shields and Young (1993). 
  Incentive proportion 
 
Proportion of incentive bonus out of total annual compensation to subordinates. 
Single item construct. 
Incentive determination  
  Subjective Use of subjectivity in determining subordinate compensation. Formative construct 
measured as the average of two items based on Ittner, Larcker and Meyer (2003a) 
and Gibbs, Merchant, Van der Stede Vargus (2004). 
  Objective Use of predetermined, quantitative targets in determining subordinate compensation. 
Reflective construct measured as the average of two items based on Ittner et al. 
(2003a) and Gibbs et al. (2004). 
  Non-financial weight Weight placed on non-financial (versus financial) performance measures in 
determining subordinate compensation. 
Incentive type  
  Financial 
 
Use of financial rewards (e.g., bonuses) to compensate subordinates. Single item. 
  Non-financial 
 
Use of non-financial rewards (e.g., recognition, promotion) to compensate 
subordinates. Single item. 
 
 
A.6 Cultural controls 






  Based on values Emphasis on alignment with SBU values and beliefs in selection decisions. Single 
item construct based on Chatman (1991), Harrison and Carroll (1991), Snell (1992), 
and Widener (2004). 
  Internal promotions Preference to promote internally versus external recruitment. Single item construct 
based on Chatman (1991), Harrison and Carroll (1991), Snell (1992), and Widener 
(2004). 
  Job rotation Degree to which rotation between multiple positions is required for promotion. 
Single item construct based on Chatman (1991), Harrison and Carroll (1991), Snell 
(1992), and Widener (2004). 
  Leadership Degree to which leadership performance is connected to rewards and promotions. 
Single item construct based on Chatman (1991), Harrison and Carroll (1991), Snell 
(1992), and Widener (2004). 
  Socialization Emphasis placed on socialization processes (e.g., training, social events, mentoring) 
to reinforce SBU values and beliefs. Formative construct measured as the average of 
three constructs based on Malmi and Brown (2008).   
Belief systems Indicate to what extent… 
  Value statements Emphasis on value statements to reinforce SBU values and norms. Reflective 
construct measured as the average of four items based on Simons (2005) and 
Bedford and Malmi (2015).  
  Vision statements Emphasis on vision statements to reinforce SBU objectives and purpose. Reflective 
construct measured as the average of four items based on Simons (1995). 
 
 
A.7 Control variables 
Construct Variable definition and measurement 
Environment  
Unpredictability Degree of uncertainty in the operating environment of the firm (Dess & Beard, 
1984). Formative construct measured as the average of six items relating to 
customer, supplier, competitor, technology, regulatory and economic dimensions 
(Bedford & Malmi, 2015). 
Complexity Degree of diversity in the main factors relevant to firm operations (Dess & Beard, 
1984). Formative construct measured as the average of two items relating customer 
requirements and competitor strategies (Bedford & Malmi, 2015). 
Hostility Degree of threat from the operating environment (Miller & Friesen, 1983). Formative 
construct measured as the average of two items relating to competition intensity and 
difficulty of obtaining necessary inputs (Bedford & Malmi, 2015). 
Strategy  
Low cost Emphasis on competing through low price (Porter, 1980). Measured through a single 
item. 
Innovation Emphasis on competing through product innovation (Ittner, Larcker & Randall, 
2003b). Reflective construct measured as the average of two items. 
Ownership  
Family Dummy variable. Coded 1 if the firm is primarily family owned, 0 otherwise. 
Government Dummy variable. Coded 1 if the firm is publicly owned, 0 otherwise. 
Institutional Dummy variable. Coded 1 if the firm is primarily owned by institutional investors, 0 
otherwise. 
Venture capitalists Dummy variable. Coded 1 if primarily owned by a venture capital firm, 0 otherwise. 
Firm characteristics  
Firm size Natural log of the number of employees. 
Firm complexity Number of primary and support functions located within the firm. 
95 
 
SOX compliance Dummy variable. Coded 1 if the firm has full or partial compliance with SOX. 
Coded 0 if no compliance. 
Stock exchange listing Dummy variable. Coded 1 if the firm is listed on a stock exchange, 0 otherwise. 
Industry Dummy variables indicating single digit NACE codes. 





























APPENDIX Appendix B 
QUESTIONNAIRE ITEMS, FACTOR LOADINGS, CRONBACH ALPHAQuestionnaire 
items, factor loadings, and Cronbach alphas 
 
B.1 Administrative controls 




Organizational structure     
Delegation of 
authority 
Compare the degree of influence that SBU 
top management has to that of subordinates 
on the following decisions: 
   
   Strategic decisions Establishment of new businesses N/A, SBU top 
management has all 
influence/Subordinates 
have all influence 
0.73 0.77 
  Development of new products/ services  0.63  
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Formatted: Font: Not Bold
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 Extension/ enlargement investments  0.82  
 Replacement investments  0.61  
    Business decisions Product/ service pricing N/A, SBU top 
management has all 
influence/Subordinates 
have all influence 
0.73 0.74 
 Distribution channel choice  0.69  
 Choosing and contracting customers  0.63  
 Choosing and contracting suppliers  0.54  
   Operational decisions Prioritizing activities N/A, SBU top 
management has all 
influence/Subordinates 
have all influence 
0.58 0.70 
 Compensation policy and rewards within the 
BU 
 0.72  
 Hiring and firing employees within the BU  0.61  
 Work process arrangements within the BU  0.55  
   Matrix structures Please indicate to what extent subordinates: Not at all/Very high extent  0.61 
 Have multiple reporting lines  0.70  
 Assume roles besides managing a unit   0.59  
Management processes     
  Team interaction  
 
    
    Within the SBU Indicate how often different types of 





    Across the SBU Indicate how often different types of 





  Team composition     
    Stability within SBU To what extent are management group 
structures stable? 
Dynamic/stable  n/a 
    Stability across SBU To what extent are management group 
structures stable?  
Dynamic/stable  n/a 
    Breadth within the  
    SBU 
How broadly based are management 
groups?  
Narrow/broad  n/a 
    Breadth across the  
    SBU 
How broadly based are management 
groups?  
Narrow/broad  n/a 
Rules and procedures  
 
In guiding and directing subordinates’ 
behaviour, to what extent does SBU top 
management: 
   
  Pre-action reviews Review plans before action?  Not at all/Very high extent 0.82 n/a 
 Employ written authorization levels and 
decision rules? 
 0.82  
 Boundary system Make the sanctions of unethical business 
conduct known for subordinates (e.g. by 
written statements)?  
Not at all/Very high extent 0.67 n/a 
   Employ written guidelines that stipulate 
specific areas for, or limits on, opportunity 
search and experimentation? 
 0.72  
 Actively communicate in writing the risks 
and activities to be avoided by subordinates? 
 0.77  
 Apply sanctions to subordinates who engage 
in risks outside organizational policy, 
irrespective of the outcome? 
 0.77  
 
B.2 Strategic planning 
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Content     
  Comprehensiveness 
 
Indicate to what extent your SBU’s strategic 
planning produces ends and means that are:   
Not at all/Very high 
extent 
 n/a 
 Qualitative (e.g., vision, strategic intent, new 
markets, new technologies)   
 0.75  
 Quantitative (e.g. EVA, ROCE, Turnover, 
market share, brand value) 
 0.75  
  Specificity 
 
Indicate to what extent your SBU’s strategic 
planning produces ends and means that are… 
Not at all/Very high 
extent 
 0.85 
 Detailed (ends)  0.63  
 Accurate (ends)  0.67  
 Documented (ends)  0.62  
 Detailed (means)  0.78  
 Accurate (means)  0.76  
 Documented (means)  0.74  
Review frequency     
  Ends Indicate how often your SBU’s strategic ends 
are reviewed 
Monthly, quarterly, three 
times a year, twice a year, 
once a year, every second 
year and every third year 
or less frequently 
 n/a 
  Means Indicate how often your SBU’s strategic 
means are reviewed 
Monthly, quarterly, three 
times a year, twice a year, 
once a year, every second 
year and every third year 
or less frequently 
 n/a 
Revision frequency     
  Ends Indicate how often your SBU’s strategic ends 
are revised 
Monthly, quarterly, three 
times a year, twice a year, 
once a year, every second 
year and every third year 
or less frequently 
 n/a 
   Means Indicate how often your SBU’s strategic 
meqans are revised 
Monthly, quarterly, three 
times a year, twice a year, 
once a year, every second 
year and every third year 
or less frequently 
 n/a 
Subordinate participation     
 Ends Indicate who participates in the formation of 
your SBU’s strategic ends 




  Only top management of 
the SBU 
  
   Only SBU management, 
including one level of 
managers below SBU top 
management 
  
  Only SBU management, 
including two levels of 
managers below SBU top 
management 
  
  More than two levels of 
managers below SBU top 
management 
  
  Means Indicate who participates in the formation of 
your SBU’s strategic means 









  Only SBU management, 
including one level of 
managers below SBU top 
management 
  
  Only SBU management, 
including two levels of 
managers below SBU top 
management 
  
  More than two levels of 




B.3 Action planning 




Content Indicate how important it is that 
subordinates’ short-term plans contain 
information about: 
Not at all/Very important  n/a 
 Progress schedule of activities, projects, 
programs 
 0.44  
 Coordinating activities within and/or across 
the units  
 0.59  
 Forming cross-functional projects and 
project teams 
 0.62  
 Financial resource requirements   0.53  
 Human resource requirements  0.69  
 Skills and competency requirements  0.68  
 IT-resource requirements  0.69  
Revision frequency     
  Target 
 
Indicate how often targets are updated Almost continuously, 
monthly, bimonthly, 
quarterly, three times a 
year, biannually and 
annually 
 n/a 
  Action plans 
 
Indicate how often action plans are updated Almost continuously, 
monthly, bimonthly, 
quarterly, three times a 
year, biannually and 
annually 
 n/a 




quarterly, three times a 
year, biannually and 
annually 
 n/a 
Subordinate participation     
  Plan development Indicate how strategic ends and means are 
translated into short-term action plans in 
your SBU 
Action plans are decided 
at the top and given to 
lower level to be 
implemented 
 n/a 
  Important areas of action 
are defined at the top and 
subordinates are required 
to develop specific action 
plans  
  
  Action plans arise in 
intensive negotiations 
within planning 
guidelines given from the 
top  
  





interpretations of how to 
affect upper level 
strategic objectives  
  Subordinates 
autonomously determine 
actions within strategic 
themes along the business 
  
  Targets ends 
 
Indicate how short-term targets are set in 
your SBU 
  n/a 
  Top management sets 
targets and passes them to 
subordinates  
  
  Top management sets 
targets, but revises them 
in negotiations with 
subordinates 
  
  Targets setting is quite 




  Subordinates set 
autonomously targets, but 
they are subject to top 
management acceptance 
  
  Subordinates set targets 
autonomously with little, 
if any, management 
involvement 
  
  Targets means Indicate how short-term targets are set in 
your SBU 
  n/a 
  Top management sets 
targets and passes them to 
subordinates  
  
  Top management sets 
targets, but revises them 
in negotiations with 
subordinates 
  
  Targets setting is quite 




  Subordinates set 
autonomously targets, but 
they are subject to top 
management acceptance 
  
  Subordinates set targets 
autonomously with little, 




B.4 Performance measurement and evaluation 




Budgets To what extent does SBU management use 
budgets for the following: 
   
  Diagnostic use Identify critical performance variables (i.e. 
factors indicating progress towards strategic 
objectives) 
Not at all/Very high 
extent 
0.71 0.78 
   Set targets for critical performance variables  0.82  
 Monitor progress towards and to correct 
deviations from preset performance targets 
 0.72  
100 
 
  Interactive use Provide a recurring and frequent agenda for top 
management activities 
Not at all/Very high 
extent 
0.76 0.82 
   
 
Provide a recurring and frequent agenda for 
subordinate activities 
 0.76  
 Enable continual challenge of underlying data, 
assumptions and action plans with subordinates  
 0.73  
 Focus attention on strategic uncertainties (i.e. 
threats and opportunities) 
 0.55  
 Encourage and facilitate dialogue and 
information sharing with subordinates 
 0.66  
Performance 
measurement systems 
To what extent does SBU management use 
performance measurement for the following: 
   
Diagnostic use Identify critical performance variables (i.e. 
factors indicating progress towards strategic 
objectives) 
Not at all/Very high 
extent 
0.83 0.88 
   Set targets for critical performance variables  0.85  
 Monitor progress towards and to correct 
deviations from preset performance targets 
 0.84  
Interactive use Provide a recurring and frequent agenda for top 
management activities 
Not at all/Very high 
extent 
0.83 0.86 
   
 
Provide a recurring and frequent agenda for 
subordinate activities 
 0.82  
 Enable continual challenge of underlying data, 
assumptions and action plans with subordinates  
 0.77  
 Focus attention on strategic uncertainties (i.e. 
threats and opportunities) 
 0.59  
 Encourage and facilitate dialogue and 
information sharing with subordinates 
 0.71  
Performance evaluation 
measures 
Indicate to what extent SBU top management 
bases subordinates’ performance evaluation on: 
Not at all/Very high 
extent 
  
  Financial 
 
Financial measures  0.77 0.68 
 Aggregate, summary measures   0.69  
  Non-financial  Non-financial measures   n/a 
  Detailed Detailed measures (e.g. budget line item, input 
volume, time, quality) 
  n/a 
  Aggregate Aggregate, summary measures (e.g. EBIT, 
profit, ROI, ROCE, market share, brand value, 
brand image, total customer satisfaction) 
  n/a 
  Personal Achievements in leadership behaviour    0.60 0.68 
 Actions and activities taken  0.59  
 Individual effort  0.75  
  Relative 
 
Indicate to what extent SBU top management 
evaluates subordinates’ performance in relation 
to: 
Not at all/Very high 
extent 
 0.63 
 Internal benchmarks   0.68  
 External benchmarks   0.61  
 Past performance   0.54  
  Number of measures For how many performance measures does 
SBU top management hold subordinates 
accountable? 
  n/a 
Performance evaluation 
frequency 
Indicate how often formalized performance 
evaluations are conducted in your SBU 
   
  Leadership 
performance   
 Monthly, quarterly, three 
times a year, twice a year, 




frequently than once a 
year, N/A 
  Business performance  Monthly, quarterly, three 
times a year, twice a year, 
once a year, less 





B.5 Reward and compensation 




Incentive intensity     
  Incentive use Indicate to what extent: Not at all/Very high extent  n/a 
   Performance-pay contracts are customized 
for each subordinate  
 0.78  
 Financial rewards increase as subordinate’s 
performance exceeds targets 
 0.78  
  Incentive proportion 
 
How many percent of their total annual 
income can subordinates receive as 
performance-based bonuses in your SBU? 
Percent of annual salary  n/a 
Incentive determination Indicate to what extent the following 
statements describe the way of evaluating 
and compensating subordinates’ 
performance in your SBU 
   
  Subjective We determine weights of performance 
measures as the evaluation takes place 
 0.84 n/a 
 We adjust the amount of bonus based on 
actual circumstances 
 0.84  
  Objective We evaluate performance on the basis of 
quantitative metrics 
 0.77 0.72 
 We use predetermined criteria in evaluation 
and rewarding 
 0.73  
  Non-financial weight Indicate weight (%) of each measure in 
rewarding formula 
  n/a 
Incentive type Rewarding is: Not at all/Very high extent   
  Financial 
 
Financial (bonuses, share-based rewards)   n/a 
  Non-financial 
 
Non-financial (e.g. recognition, promotion, 
training) 
  n/a 
Incentive purpose How important are the following purposes of 
financial rewarding in your SBU: 
Not at all/Very important   
  Commitment Committing subordinates   n/a 
  Motivation Motivating subordinates   n/a 
  Directing attention Directing subordinates’ attention   n/a 
     
 
 
B.6 Cultural controls 




Selection and promotion Indicate to what extent: Not at all/Very high extent   
  Based on values Are psychological tests and values of 
importance when recruiting for 
managerial positions? 
  n/a 
  Internal promotions Are promotions made from within the 
organization? 
  n/a 
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  Job rotation Is subordinate rotation between various 
positions seen as an important 
precondition for promotion? 
  n/a 
  Leadership Is leadership-based performance 
connected to significant rewards (e.g. 
promotions, equity-based rewards)? 
  n/a 
  Socialization Are training and development processes 
used to reinforce SBU objectives, 
expectations and norms? 
 0.77 n/a 
 Are social events and functions used to 
develop and maintain commitment to the 
SBU? 
 0.71  
 
Are mentoring, orientation and induction 
programs used to acclimatise new 
managers to acceptable behaviours, 
routines and norms? 
 0.75  
Belief systems Indicate to what extent: Not at all/Very high extent   
  Value statements Are the values and purpose of the SBU 
codified in formal documents? (e.g. 
value statements, credos, statements of 
purpose)  
 0.64 0.82 
 Are formal statements of values used to 
commit subordinates to the long-term 
objectives of SBU? 
 0.79  
 Are formal statements of values used to 
motivate subordinates in sharing 
responsibility? 
 0.82  
 Do you count on value and mission 
statements guiding actions of your 
subordinates? 
 0.70  
  Vision statements Is the direction of the SBU codified in 
formal documents? (e.g. vision 
statement, statement of strategic intent) 
 0.65 0.79 
 Is the vision statement so concise that 
your subordinates can remember it all the 
time?   
 0.71  
 Is the vision statement so specific that it 
guides your subordinates to say ‘no’ for 
some business opportunities?  
 0.63  
 Do you count on the vision statement 
guiding actions of your subordinates? 
 0.82  
 
 
B.7 Control variables 




Environment     
  Unpredictability Over the past three years: How many 
changes have occurred that have had a 
material impact on the nature of your 
business? 
Very few changes/Very 
many changes 
 n/a 
 Customers  0.57  
 Suppliers  0.60  
 Competitors  0.65  
 Technological  0.60  
 Regulatory  0.55  
 Economic  0.24  
  Complexity How diverse are the product/service 







   How diverse are the strategies and tactics of 




  Hostility How intense is the competition for your main 
products/services? 
Not intense at all/Very 
high intensity 
0.74 n/a 
 How difficult is it to obtain the necessary 
inputs for your business? 
Not difficult at all/very 
high difficulty 
0.74  
Strategy Indicate to what extent you agree with the 
following: 
Not at all/Very high 
extent 
  
  Low cost We compete by the lowest price   n/a 
  Innovation Our success depends on product/ service 
novelty 
 0.89 0.70 
 Our success is driven by product innovations  0.59  






Firm characteristics     
  Firm size What is the number of employees in your 
SBU? 
Number of employees  n/a 
  Firm complexity Please indicate which functions are fully 
controlled by your SBU, i.e. these functions 
are not part of shared resource pools with 
other SBUs in your organization. 
Main functions: R&D, 
inbound logistics, 
operations, outbound 
logistics, marketing and 
sales and after-sales 
service. 
Support functions: IT, 
HRM, accounting and 
finance and procurement 
 n/a 
  SOX compliance Does your SBU comply with the SOX? No, partially and yes.  n/a 
  Stock exchange listing Is your SBU part of a publicly quoted 
company? 
No and yes.  n/a 
  Industry What is your SBU’s main industry Manufacturing, services 
and wholesale and trade 
 n/a 
  HQ location In which country is your parent company 
registered? 
Country  n/a 
  Internationalization In how many countries does your SBU have 
operations? 






APPENDIX Appendix C 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICSDescriptive statistics 
 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Administrative controls      
Organizational structure      
Delegation of authority      
Strategic decisions 654 3.10 1.22 1 6.75 
Business decisions 652 4.13 1.31 1 7 
Operational decision 658 3.85 1.21 1 7 
Matrix structures 659 3.76 1.52 1 7 
Management processes      
Team interaction      
Within SBU 651 0.72 0.65 0.25 6 
Across SBU 365 1.47 1.21 0.25 6 
Team composition      
Stability within SBU 653 5.58 1.27 1 7 
Stability across SBU 363 5.26 1.36 1 7 
Breadth within SBU 652 3.91 1.82 1 7 
Breadth across SBU 363 3.73 1.75 1 7 
Rules and procedures      
Pre-action reviews 659 4.82 1.34 1 7 
Boundary systems 658 4.36 1.40 1 7 
Strategic planning      
Time horizon 652 3.92 1.45 1 9 
Content      
Comprehensiveness 656 5.26 1.13 1 7 
Specificity 655 4.62 1.19 1 7 
Review frequency      
Ends 656 7.12 5.66 1 36 
Means 645 6.75 6.05 1 36 
Revision frequency      
Ends 649 11.64 7.38 1 36 
Means 641 9.45 7.04 1 36 
Subordinate participation      
Ends 655 2.29 1.14 1 5 
Means 650 2.69 1.14 1 6 
Action planning      
Content 658 5.04 0.87 1 7 
Revision frequency      
Targets 659 6.03 4.47 0.25 12 
Action plans 656 2.96 3.78 0.25 12 
Resource allocations 654 3.32 3.43 0.25 12 
Subordinate participation      
Plan development 656 2.48 1.03 1 5 
Targets (ends) 657 2.09 0.88 1 5 
Targets (means) 654 2.61 1.02 1 5 
Performance measurement and evaluation      
Formatted: Left




Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Budgets      
Diagnostic use 638 5.39 1.22 1 7 
Interactive use 638 4.68 1.23 1 7 
Performance measurement systems      
Diagnostic use 608 5.43 1.33 1 7 
Interactive use 609 4.77 1.33 1 7 
Performance evaluation measures      
Financial 658 5.68 1.48 1 7 
Non-financial 658 5.14 1.39 1 7 
Detailed 658 4.88 1.58 1 7 
Aggregate 658 5.16 1.66 1 7 
Personal 657 4.74 1.23 1 7 
Relative 659 3.74 1.39 1 7 
Number of measures 647 5.53 3.43 0 30 
Performance evaluation frequency      
Leadership 634 9.71 4.84 1 24 
Business 643 7.03 5.51 1 24 
Rewards and compensation      
Incentive intensity      
Incentive use 655 4.09 1.69 1 7 
Incentive maximum 650 21.03 21.00 0 400 
Incentive determination      
Subjectivity 648 3.11 1.77 1 7 
Objectivity 649 5.21 1.77 1 7 
Non-financial weight 545 34.28 29.88 0 100 
Incentive type      
Financial 652 5.51 1.86 1 7 
Non-financial 653 3.75 1.79 1 7 
Incentive purpose      
Commitment 653 4.66 1.80 1 7 
Motivation 653 4.93 1.69 1 7 
Directing attention 654 4.96 1.77 1 7 
Cultural controls      
Selection and promotion      
Based on values 658 4.58 1.83 1 7 
Internal promotions 658 5.16 1.24 1 7 
Job rotation 658 3.84 1.63 1 7 
Leadership 658 3.97 1.79 1 7 
Socialization 658 4.58 1.11 1.33 7 
Belief systems      
Value statements 658 4.75 1.35 1 7 
Vision statements 658 4.66 1.31 1 7 
Control variables      
Environment      
Unpredictability 655 3.97 0.91 1.2 6.67 
Complexity 654 3.78 1.32 1 7 






Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Strategy      
Low cost 656 3.08 1.82 1 7 
Innovation 657 4.18 1.48 1 7 
Firm characteristics      
Firm size 654 6.61 1.16 3.56 11.17 
Firm complexity 654 6.51 2.83 0 10 
Internationalisation 653 8.07 18.14 0 220 
Dummy variables N x=1    
Ownership      
Family 649 246    
Government 649 49    
Institutional 649 166    
Venture capitalists 649 59    
SOX compliance 656 178    
Stock exchange listing 659 297    
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